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INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the interrelation of the Safety Appliances Acts' and
the Boiler Inspection Act2 with the Federal Employers' Liability Act,3
may appropriately begin with some legislative history to indicate the
development of federal legislation in regard to railroad safety. Federal
legislation in this field received its first real impetus about 1889 when
President Harrison in his message to Congress4 and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission in its annual report to Congress5 referred to the great
risks involved in railroading and particularly to the use of link-and-pin
couplers and of brakes which were not continuous throughout the train
and controlled automatically from the engine. These were followed by
Presidential Messages in 1890, 1891 and 1892,0 and by references to
the problem in the Fifth and Sixth Annual Reports of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.7 It should be noted that the major emphasis of
these messages and reports was directed to the risks to life and limb of
employees involved in coupling operations and the use of handbrakes
rather than a unified system of air brakes. In the Senate and House
Reports on bills arising from these recommendations, the same emphasis
is evident.8 When the original Safety Appliance Act was passed in 1893,
its preamble read:
An act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon
railroads by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate
commerce to equip their cars with automatic couplers and con-
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1 Acts of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 STAT. 531, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§1-7
(1952 ed.); March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 STAT. 943, 45 U.S.C. §§8-10 (1952 ed.);
April 14, 1910, c. 160, 36 STAT. 298, 45 U.S.C. §§11-16 (1952 ed.). Hereinafter
these Acts will be cited by the date of the original act, section of the original act
and the U.S. Code section.
2 Act of-February 17, 1911, c. 103, 36 STAT. 913, as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§§22-34 (1952 ed.) Hereinafter this Act will be cited by the section of the original
act and the U.S. Code section.
3 Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 STAT. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§51-60
(1952 ed.) This act will be referred to throughout this article as FELA, and
citations will be to the sections of the original act and the U.S. Code section.
4The relevant portions of this message appear in SEN. REP. No. 1049, 52d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892).
5 3 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 84, 293 (1889).
6 See SEN. REP. No. 1049, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1892), for the relevant
portions of these messages.
7 5 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 337 (1891); 6 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 69 (1892).
S SEN. REP. No. 1049, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1892); H.R. REP. No. 1678,
52d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1892).
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tinuous brakes and their locomotives with driving-wheel brakes,
and for other purposes.9
The first section of this original Act made it unlawful for a
common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to use on
its line any locomotive engine in moving interstate traffic if it was not
equipped with power brakes and appliances for operating a train-brake
system or to run a train in such traffic without sufficient cars equipped
with power brakes so that the engineer in the locomotive could control its
speed without requiring brakemen to use handbrakes."0 The Act also
prohibited a railroad from hauling or permitting to be hauled or used on
its line "any car used in moving interstate traffic," unless it be equipped
with couplers "coupling automatically by impact, and which can be un-
coupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the
cars."'" Another section prohibited the use of any car in interstate com-
merce unless it be provided with "secure grab irons or handholds in the
ends and sides of each car for greater security to men in coupling and
uncoupling cars." 12 The Act also provided for the establishment of uni-
form height for drawbars, an essential part of the coupling apparatus,
and prohibited the use of any freight car in interstate traffic which did
not comply with this standard.' 3 For each and every violation of the
provisions of this Act, a penalty of $100 was imposed, to be recovered
by the United States District Attorney in the district where the violation
occurred. 4 Finally, the Act provided that "any employee of any such
common carrier who may be injured by any locomotive, car, or train in
use contrary to the provision of this act shall not be deemed thereby to
have assumed the risk thereby occasioned, although continuing in the
employment of such carrier after the unlawful use of such locomotive,
car, or train had been brought to his knowledge." 5
In 1903, the provisions relating to brakes, automatic couplers, grab
irons and drawbars were extended to apply "to all trains, locomotives,
tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad engaged in inter-
state commerce, and in the Territories and the District of Columbia,
and to all other locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used in
connection therewith," except four-wheel cars, logging cars and cars used
upon street railways. 6 This had the effect of including within the pro-
927 STAT. 531 (1893). Similar preambles also occurred in the other two
Safety Appliance Acts of 1903 and 1910.
10 Act of March 2, 1893, §1, 45 U.S.C. §1 (1952 ed.).
11 Act of March 2, 1893, §2, 45 U.S.C. §2 (1952 ed.).
12 Act of March 2, 1893, §4, 45 U.S.C. §4 (1952 ed.).
13 Act of March 2, 1893, §5, 45 U.S.C. §5 (1952 ed.).
14 Act of March 2, 1893, §6, as amended 45 U.S.C. §6 (1952 ed.).
15 Act of March 2, 1893, §8, 45 U.S.C. §7 (1952 ed.).
10 Act of March 2, 1903, §1, 45 U.S.C. §8 (1952 ed.). This same section con-
tains a provision that the original act should apply "whether or not the couplers
brought together are of the same kind, make, or type;" which was apparently
added in answer to the practice of different carriers using different couplers which
19561
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visions of the Act cars which were in fact being used in transporting
intrastate freight or passengers, so long as the carrier itself was engaged in
interstate commerce.
1 7
The 1910 Safety Appliance Act' s added further appliances to the
list required.' 9 A $100 penalty was imposed for violation of its pro-
visions of the Act cars which are in fact being used in transporting
intrastate freight or passengers, so long as the carrier itself was engaged in
that such crippled car might be hauled from the place of discovery "to
the nearest available point where such car can be repaired" without
penalty, but adding "such movement or hauling of such car shall be at
the sole risk of the carrier, and nothing in this section shall be construed
to relieve such carrier from liability in any remedial action for the death
or injury of any railroad employee caused to such employee by reason of
or in connection with the movement or hauling of such car with equip-
ment which is defective or insecure or which is not maintained in accord-
ance with the requirements of this chaper."
20
The Boiler Inspection Act,2 ' passed in 1911, contained a preamble
like that of the Safety Appliance Acts and provided, inter alia, that:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, its officers or
agents, subject to this Act to use any locomotive engine pro-
pelled by steam power in moving interstate or foreign traffic
unless the boiler of said locomotive and appurtenances thereof
are in proper condition and safe to operate in the service to
which the same is put, that the same may be employed in moving
traffic without unnecessary peril to life or limb, and all boilers
shall be inspected from time to time in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, and be able to withstand such test or
tests as may be prescribed in the rules and regulation hereinafter
provided f or.
22
Another section of the Act2 made the rules and regulations of carriers
as approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission obligatory and
provided for changes to be filed and approved by the Commission.
In 1915, the Boiler Inspection Act was amended to include not
only the boiler, but "the entire locomotive and tender and all parts and
did not couple with each other automatically. See 7 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 74, 76
(1893) ; 16 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 57, 61, 62 (1902).
17 See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Southern Ry.
v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) ; Fort Worth Belt Ry. v. United States, 22
F. 2d 795 (5th Cir. 1927); Pacific Coast Ry. v. United States, 173 Fed. 448 (9th
Cir. 1909) ; Ross v. Duluth, M & I. R. Ry., 203 Minn. 312, 218 N.W. 76 (1938).
1 8 Act of April 14, 1910, 45 U.S.C. §11-16 (1952 ed.).
19 Sill steps, efficient hand brakes, secure ladders, secure running boards,
secure handholds.
2 0 Act of April 14, 1910, §4, 45 U.S.C. §13 (1952 ed.).
2 1 Act of February 11, 1911, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§22-34 (1952 ed.).
22 Act of February 11, 1911, §2, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §23 (1952 ed.).
23 Act of February 11, 1911, §5, as amended 45 U.S.C. §28 (1952 ed.).
[Vol. 17
RAILROAD SAFETY ACTS
appurtenances thereof."2 4  Seven years later another amendment re-
moved reference to interstate and foreign commerce from the relevant
sections.2" Although some courts since that date have referred to the
Act as covering only engines moving in interstate commerce, the problem
before them seems to have been whether the car or locomotive was being
"used on its line" rather than whether the car was "moving interstate or
foreign traffic."
26
With the exception of the abolition of the defense of assumption
of risk under the Safety Appliance Act2 ' and the proviso in the 1910 Act
with relation to movement of defective cars to the nearest available
repair point being at the carrier's sole risk,2' neither the Safety Appliance
Acts nor the Boiler Inspection Act makes any reference to a right of
action in persons who may be injured by violations of their provisions.
Yet, the preambles of the acts spell out that they are for the protection
of "employees and travelers upon railroads." The lack of more explicit
language creating causes of action under these acts today may arise from
the fact that in 190629 and again in 1908,'o the Federal Employers'
Liability Acts specifically created a cause of action in the case of an
employee of an interstate railroad for injuries or death "'resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery .. . or
other equipment."" While the original FELA apparently extended to
employees who were engaged in intrastate commerce,3 2 the present day
act is limited to injuries or death suffered "while he is employed by such
carrier in such [interstate] commerce." 3 In 1939, the FELA was
amended to extend the coverage to employees, any part of whose duties
"shall be in the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall,
in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as
above set forth. . . ."" Aside from these statutory provisions, the courts
have for many years recognized that where there is a violation of the
24 Act of March 4, 1915, c. 169, §1, 38 STAT. 1192.
25 Act of June 7, 1924, c. 355, §2, 43 STAT. 659, 45 U.S.C. §23 (1952 ed.).
26 See, e.g., Compton v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 267, 161 P. 2d 40
(1945); Harlan v. Wabash Ry., 335 Mo. 414, 73 S.W. 2d 749 (1934).
27 Act of March 2, 1893, §8, 45 U.S.C. §7 (1952 ed.).
2 8 Act of April 14, 1910, §4, 45 U.S.C. §13 (1952 ed.).
29 Act of June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 STAT. 232, declared unconstitutional in
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
3o Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, §5 STAT. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§51-60
(1952 ed.).
-3 Act of April 22, 1908, §1, 45 U.S.C. §51, first paragraph (1952 ed.).
32Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
33 Act of April 22, 1908, §1, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952 ed.).
34 Act of August 11, 1939, c. 685, §1, 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U.S.C. §51, second
paragraph (1952 ed.).
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Safety Appliance or Boiler Inspection Acts, the violation may give rise to
a common law cause of action. s
In the discussion which follows, these three acts will be compared
in terms of the nature of the duty imposed upon the carrier under each,
how a breach of such duty may be established, the extent of protection
offered by the acts in terms of potential plaintiffs and injuries covered,
the defenses available to carriers under each of the acts, and certain
problems of joinder and pleading of causes of action under the acts.
NATURE OF THE CARRIER's DuTY AND BREACH THEREOF
The most obvious distinction between the FELA on the one hand
and the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts on the other is the
nature of the duty which is imposed upon the carrier under each. The
FELA predicates liability upon the "negligence" of the carrier, its
officers, agents and employees, which the courts have uniformly taken
to mean the common law doctrines of negligence which would be applied
in other types of personal or property injury actions." Variations from
this common law doctrine arise from the specific language of the Act
itself in abolishing assumption of risk" and the "fellow servant"
doctrineas as absolute defenses and introducing the concept of "compara-
35 See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1915) ; Moore v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934) ; Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry.. 292 U.S.
57 (1934).
36 See, e.g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 61 (1949) ; Bailey v. Central
Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-353 (1943); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
318 U.S. 54, 67 (1942); Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R.R., 164 F. 2d 996, 998 (3d
Cir. 1947), aff'd, 335 U.S. 329 (1947); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Johnson, 199
F. 2d 750, 751 (5th Cir. 1952), rehearing denied, 200 F. 2d 619 (5th Cir. 1952);
Hutchins v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 162 F. 2d 189, 192 (6th Cir. 1947); Larsen v.
Chicago & N.W. R.R., 171 F. 2d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Sheaf v. Minneapolis,
St. P., M. & 0. R.R., 162 F. 2d 110, 113 (8th Cir. 1947); Carpenter v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 109 Cal. App. 2d 18, 21-22, 240 P. 2d 5, 7 (1952); Hughes v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 265 S.W. 2d 273, 277 (Mo. 1954); Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R.,
147 Neb. 18, 21-22, 22 N.W. 2d 305, 308 (1946), reqsd on other grounds, 329 U.S.
649 (1947); Beam v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 77 Ohio App. 419, 426427, 68 N.E.
2d 159, 164 (1945); August v. Texas & N. 0. K.R., 265 S.W. 2d 148, 152 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954).
37Act of April 22, 1908, §4, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §54 (1952 ed.): "That
in any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of
the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for injuries to, or the death of,
any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks
of his employment in any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such
carrier; and no employee shall be held to have assumed the risks of his employ-
ment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted
for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
38 Act of April 22, 1908, §§1, 4, as amended, 45 U.S.C., §§51, 54 (1952 ed.),
refer to injuries "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
officers, agents or employees of such carrier," which language has been interpreted
as doing away with the "fellow servant" doctrine. T;!ler v. Ai.antic Coast Line
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tive negligence" rather than contributory negligence into actions brought
under the FELA alone.39 Included in this concept of duty is the principle
stated by the Supreme Court at about the time when the Safety Appli-
ance Acts were given their first official impetus:
Neither individuals nor corporations are bound, as employers
to insure the absolute safety of the machinery or mechanical
appliances which they provide for the use of their employees.
Nor are they bound to supply the best and safest or newest of
these appliances for the purpose of securing the safety of those
who are thus employed. They are, however, bound to use all
reasonable care and prudence for the safety of those in their
service, by providing them with machinery reasonably safe and
suitable for the use of the latter.4"
Contrasted with the requirement of "reasonable care" implicit in
the FELA is the language of the Safety Appliance Acts, which speak
of failure to comply with their provisions as "unlawful." Since the
Acts are designed for the protection of a specified class, "employees and
travelers upon railroads,"4 they could be treated as setting up definite
standards of "due care" violation of which would constitute "negligence
per se."'42 However, the leading case on the question of the nature of
R.R., 318 U. S. 54 (1943) ; Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930) ; Chesapeake
& 0. Ry. v. De Atley, 241 U. S. 310 (1916) ; Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Rock,
279 U. S. 410 (1929) ; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., v. Ward, 252 U. S. 18 (1920) ; Central
Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915).
39 Act of April 22, 1908, §3, 45 U.S.C. §53 (1952 ed.) : "In all actions here-
after brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of
any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries
to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that
the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a
recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to such employee; Provided, That no such em-
ployee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of
any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death
of suuch employee." A fuller discussion of the effect of the three Acts upon these
defenses will be found infra p. 000.
40Washington & G. R.R. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 570 (1889); accord,
Patton v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 179 U.S. 658, 664 (1901). See also 2 JAGOARD, ToRTS
§279 (1895); LABATT, MASTER & SERVANT §§14, 22a (1904); PoLLOCK, TORTS 88
(137) ; PROSSER, TORTS §67 (2d ed. 1955), for the cbmmon law duty of master to
servant.
41 See, Preamble, 27 STAT. 531 (1893). It should be noted that persons other
than employees and travelers on the railroad have in fact recovered under this
Act. Fairport, P. & E. R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934) (travelers on high-
way) ; Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 350 U.S. 318 (1956) (independent
contractor unloading tank car for consignee) ; Rush v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 568,
202 SAV. 2d 800 (1947) (government employee engaged in unloading coal).
42 At the time of the original Safety Appliance Act, it was recognized that
the violation of a specific legislative provision, designed for the protection of a
particular class of persons, might be treated, without specific provision for civil
liability, as creating a duty toward anyone within the protected class. 2 JAGGARD,
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the duty imposed by the Safety Appliance Acts, St. Louis, Iron Mountain
& Superior Ry. v. Taylor 43 spoke in terms of an "absolute duty" which
was to supplant the "qualified duty of the common law," and violation
of which absolute duty created "the liability to make compensation to
one who is injured by it."" This language of "absolute duty" has been
repeated again and again by the Supreme Court and others.43 While an-
TORTS §263 (1895). This was spoken of as "negligence per se," in the sense that
the jury was not entitled to determine whether a reasonable man might have
anticipated harm as likely to result from the act which violated the statute or
whether a reasonable man would have done the act. See Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319-323 (1914); PROSSER, TORTS 161
(2d ed. 1955). Cf. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16
MINN. L. REv. 361 (1932). Professor Clarence Morris has expounded the theory
that, in applying criminal statutes in civil actions, the courts are in fact creating
a duty of their own based on a criminal standard established by the legislature.
MORRIS, TORTS 64-77 (1953); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Neqligence
tctlions, 49 COLUMN. L. REv. 21 (1949), reprinted in MORRIS, STvUIEs IN THE LAW
OF TORTS 141 (1953) ; Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability,
46 HARv. L. Rav. 453 (1933). While Thayer, Lowndes, Morris and Prosser speak
of "criminal legislation," their discussions seem equally applicable to the Safety
Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts which do impose penalties for violation,
45 U.S.C. §§ 6, 13, 34- (1953 ed.). Actions brought under these penalty sections
are treated as civil rather than criminal actions, Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United
States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911); United States v. Great Northern Ry., 229 Fed. 927
(9th Cir. 1916), and while the Supreme Court has admitted that the Safety Ap-
pliance Acts have a penal aspect, it says "But the design to give relief was more
dominant than to inflict punishment . . ." Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S.
1, 17 (1904). Presumably a similar evaluation would be made of the Boiler
Inspection Act.
43210 U.S. 281 (1908).
4 4 Id. at 295.
45 E.g., Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938); St. Joseph
& G.I. Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 311, 314 (1917); Delk v St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 220
U.S. 580, 586-587 (1911) ; Lehigh Valley MR. v. Howell, 6 F. 2d 784, 785 (2d Cir.
1925); Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Auchenbach, 16- F. 2d 550, 552 (3d Cir. 1926);
Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Eisenhart, 280 Fed. 271, 276 (3d Cir. 1922); Sherry v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 30 F. 2d 487, 488 (6th Cir. 1929); Chicago Junction MR. v.
King, 169 Fed. 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1909); aff'd, 222 U.S. 222 (1911); Byler v.
Wabash R.R., 196 F. 2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952);
Zumwalt v. Gardner, 160 F. 2d 298, 304 (8th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 287 Fed. 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1923); Bocook v. Louisville & N. R.R., 67
F. Supp. 154, 157 (E.D. Ky. 1946); Campbell v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. KR., 122
F. Supp. 749, 751 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Southern Pac. Co. v. Thomas, 21 Ariz. 355,
358, 188 Pac. 268, 270 (1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 576 (1921) ; Western & A.
MR. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282, 290, 198 S.E. 257, 262 (1938), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 654 (1938) ; Davis v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 294 Ill. 355, 359, 128 N.E. 539,
540 (1920); Crowe v. Boston & M. R.R., 242 Mass. 389, 394, 136 N.E. 189, 191
(1922); Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 69 N.W. 2d 673, 681 (Minn. 1955);
Popplar v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 121 Minn. 413, 416, 141 N.W. 798,
799 (1913), affd, 237 U.S. 369 (1956); Alabama & V. Ry. v. Dennis, 128 Miss.
298, 301, 91 So. 4, 5 (1922); Colwell v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 335 Mo. 494, 502, 73
S.W. 2d 222, 226 (1934) ; Grew v. Boston & M. MR., 83 N.H. 383, 386, 14Z Ad.
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other leading case, San Antonio & Arkansas Pass Ry. v. Wagner,4
refers to a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts as " 'negligence'-what
is sometimes called negligence per se," it also makes it clear that "the
question of negligence in the general sense of want of care is im-
material."47 And in the recent case of O'Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Ry.4 1 the Court, after referring to the "diversity of judicial
opinion concerning the consequences attributed in negligence actions to
violations of a statute," goes on to say:
But this court early swept all issues of negligence out of
cases under the Safety Appliance Act. For reasons set forth
at length in our books, the Court held that a failure of equip-
ment to perform as required by the Safety Appliance Act is in
itself an actionable wrong, in no way dependent upon negli-
gence and for the proximate results of which there is liability-
a liability that cannot be escaped by proof of care or diligence.49
In Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry.,50 referring to the O'Don-
nell decision earlier in the same term, the Court says that "negligence
per se" is "a confusing label for what is simply a violation of an absolute
duty." 51 It is perhaps significant that in each of these two cases, as in
Affolder v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 52 which followed
them, the question was not one of the nature of the duty so much as a
problem of whether a mere failure to operate efficiently constituted a
breach of the duty imposed by the statute.
A similar duty is found in the cases decided under the Boiler In-
spection Act, such as Baltimore & Ohio v. Groeger 3 Southern Ry. v.
Lunsford,54 and Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R.R.,55 all of which
speak of an "absolute and continuing duty." 56  While the Court in
707, 709 (1928); Saxon v. Delaware & H. Co., 256 N.Y. 363, 364, 176 N.E. 425,
425 (1931); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Kurtz, 147 S.W. 658, 660 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1912, error denied).
16241 U.S. 476 (1916).
47Id. at 484. The use of the term "negligence per se" may be justified on
the ground that the action was brought under the FELA which speaks of a defect
"due to its negligence."
48338 U.S. 384 (1949).
491d. at 391.
50 338 U.S. 430 (1949).
51 Id. at 434.
52 339 U.S. 86 (1950).
53 266 U.S. 521, 523-524, 527 (1925).
54297 U.S. 398, 401 (1936).
55 317 U.S. 481, 485 (1943).
58 See also, Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Beltz, 10 F. 2d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1925),
cert. denied, 270 U.S. 641 (1926); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Rich, 81 F. 2d 584,
586 (6th Cir. 1936) ; McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 F. 2d 877, 881 (7th Cir.
1946); Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Smith, 256 Ala. 220, 227, 54 So. 2d 453,
458 (1951); Thornton v. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R., 187 Iowa 1158, 1162, 175
N.W. 71, 73 (1919); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 537, 182 S.W.
2d 447, 453 (1944); O'Dea v. Byram, 176 Minn. 67, 68, 222 N.W. 519, 520 (1928);
Banta v. Union Pac. R.R., 362 Mo. 421, 428, 242 S.W. 2d 34, 39 (1951).
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Urie v. Thompson57 uses the term "negligence per se" it relies on San
Antonio & Arkansas Pass. Ry. v. Wagner, and treats the Boiler In-
spection Act as in the same category as the Safety Appliance Acts."
Therefore, the later decisions in the O'Donnell, Carter and Affolder
cases would seem to apply to the Boiler Inspection Act as well.
Although the courts talk in terms of an "absolute" duty, it is dear
that the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts do not create
something akin to workmen's compensation."9 The carrier is not an
insurer against all and any injuries resulting from railroad operations,
but only becomes responsible for failure to supply equipment which is
safe within the terms of these Acts."° Even this obligation is not a
wholly unqualified one:
First, although the courts have stated repeatedly that the Safety
Appliance Acts and the Boiler Inspection Act should be construed
liberally to effectuate their humanitarian objectives," in some instances
the language of the Acts has been so construed as to limit the scope of
liability. When Section 1 of the Safety Appliance Act requires that all
trains have a sufficient number of cars equipped with power brakes, the
courts construe "train" to refer only to a combination of a locomotive
engine and cars assembled and coupled together as a unit for a run or
trip along the road,6" as contrasted with cars coupled together in a
switching operation within a single yard 3 which involves assembling and
57337 U.S. 163 (1949).
581d. at 188-189.
9 Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 485 (1947); Ehalt v. McCarthy,
104 Utah 110, 138 P. 2d 639, 644 (1943).
0 See, Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 485 (1947); O'Dea v. Byram,
176 Minn. 67, 71, 222 N.W. 519, 520 (1928); Larsen v. Northern Pac. Ry., 175
Minn. 1, 5, 220 N.W. 159, 161 (1928). Cf. Cusson v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 155 F.
2d 430 (2d Cir. 1940); Knox v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 95 Cal. App. 2d 896,
214 P. 2d 589 (1950); Johnson v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 64 N.W. 2d 373 (Minn.
1954); Schaff v. Perdue, 254 S.W. 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See also, Banta
v. Union Pac. R.R., 362 Mo. 421, 428, 242 S.W. 2d 34, 39 (1951) ("insurer as to
matters included in the [Boiler Inspection] Act"); Cantley v. Missouri-K.-T
R.R., 353 Mo. 605, 612, 183 S.W. 2d 123, 126 (1944) ("insurer with respect to
the matters mentioned in the Boiler Inspection Act").
61 See, e.g., Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943);
Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938); Johnson v. Southern Pac.
Co., 196 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1904); Bolan v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 167 F. 2d 934, 936
(2d Cir. 1948); Hines v. Smith, 275 Fed. 766, 767 (7th Cir. 1921); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Carson, 169 F. 2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1948); Missouri-K.-T. Ry. v. Evans,
151 Tex. 340, 344, 250 S.W. 2d 385, 388 (1952).
02 United States v. Erie R.R., 237 U.S. 402, 407 (1915); see also United
States v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 237 U.S. 410 (1915) ; United States v. Grand Trunk
Ry., 203 Fed. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
63 Where a railroad operated a terminal which included yards in three
cities, the Court treated these as three separate yards rather than a single yard
so that transfers from one point in the terminal to another were rated as "train
movements." United States v. Erie R.R., 237 U.S. 402 (1915). See also. Great
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breaking up "trains" and "sorting, or selecting, or classifying of [the
cars], involving coupling and uncoupling, and the movement of one or
a few at a time for short distances." '64 The basis for this distinction
would appear to be the inconvenience to the carrier in conducting
switching operations if it were necessary to maintain air connections
between all of the cars. Also, when Section 2 of the Act requires all
cars to be equipped with couplers which would couple automatically
upon impact without the necessity of men going between the cars, the
Supreme Court has interpreted "cars" as used here to exclude the loco-
motive and tender, which may be coupled with the old link-and-pin
coupler, since these two move as a single unit in normal operations and
are so situated that it is possible to couple and uncouple the tender from
the locomotive without the men actually being in danger of getting
caught between them." Similarly, although tenders are treated as cars
within the terms of Section 4 requiring all cars used in interstate com-
merce to be equipped with secure grabirons, 66 the Court has said that the
language of Section 11, providing that "all cars having ladders shall also
be equipped with secure handholds or grab irons on their roofs at the
tops of such ladders," does not include tenders because they have no
"roofs" and because the I.C.C. regulations providing for ladders on
tenders do not refer to grabirons.6" Other examples of limited inter-
pretations of the Act include the decision of a Court of Appeals6" and
the opinion of three dissenting justices of the Supreme Court69 that an
insecure "dome step" on a tank car did not fall within the requirement
of secure running boards in Section 11 when not required by the I.C.C.
regulations; and the case of a ladder which complied with the I.C.C.
regulation for clearance although it was alleged to be insecure within
the terms of Section 11 because of the presence of a brace rod which
Northern Ry. v. United States, 288 Fed. 190 (8th Cir. 1923) ; United States v.
Southern Pac. Co., 100 F. 2d 894 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Southern
Pac. Co., 60 F. 2d 864 (9th Cir. 1932).
04Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 534,
538 (1919). Compare United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 254 U.S. 251 (1920);
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. United States, 36 F. 2d 670 (8th Cir. 1929) ; United
States v. Southern Pac. Co., 60 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1932), involving "train move-
ments", qwith United States v. New York C. & H. R.R., 205 Fed. 428 (W.D. N.Y.
1913) ; Seaboard Air Line R.R., v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927) ; Rose
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 237 S.WI. 854 (Mo. App. 1922); Whalley v. Philadelphia
& R. Ry., 248 Pa. 298, 93 At. 1016 (1915), involving "switching operations." See
also Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Bartsch, 9 F. 2d 858 (3d Cir. 1925).
Gr Pennell v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 231 U.S. 675 (1914).
G6 Moore v. St. Joseph & G.I. Ry., 268 Mo. 31, 186 S.W. 1035 (1916), aff'd,
242 U.S. 311 (1917).
6 7 Davis v. Manry, 266 U.S. 401 (1925).
6 8 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Shields, 220 F. 2d 242 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd,
350 U.S. 318 (1956).
69 Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line 1KR., 350 U.S. 318, 325 (1956) (Reed, Frank-
furter and Burton, J.J., dissenting. Harlan, J., took no part in this case).
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ran at an angle near the bottom of the ladder."0 In each of these cases,
the courts may only be saying that the I.C.C. and the carriers them-
selves are better able to determine what are necessary safety devices
than are courts or juries.7 Literal interpretation has not always resulted
in a narrowing of the carrier's obligation, however, as is indicated by the
fact that an early view finding compliance with the grab iron require-
ment of Section 4 in any other appliance which afforded equal security72
seems to have been abandoned in more recent decisions saying that no
equivalents are acceptable.7
The Boiler Inspection Act is written in broader terms than the
Safety Appliance Acts, i.e., "It shall be unlawful for any carrier to
use . . . any locomotive unless said locomotive, its boiler, tender and all
parts and appurtenances thereof are in proper condition and safe to
operate in the service to which the same are put, that the same may be
employed in the active service of such carrier without unnecessary peril
to life or limb, . . ."" Such language would appear to cover almost any
possible danger which could arise from the operation of a locomotive
and tender. Yet, most of the cases arising under this Act have restricted
recovery to injuries arising from mechanical defects or inadequacies in
70 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471 (1937).
71This point is made in both the Scarlett case, supra note 70, and the Court
of Appeals opinion in the Shields case, where the court said, ". . . a chaotic
condition would be produced if the questions of compliance with the Safety Ap-
pliance Act, and the specifications governing the number, location, dimension and
manner of appliances should be left to the varying notions of judges or the inex-
perienced laymen who comprise petit juries." 200 F. 2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1955).
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, felt that the failure of the I.C.C.
to include dome steps in its regulations showed no more than that it had not
standardized all possible running boards. They pointed out that as contrasted
with Davis v. Manry, 266 U.S. 401 (1925), referred to in text at note 67 supra,
where the I.C.C. could interpret "roofs" in Section 11 as applying to tenders or
not, there was no such necessity for decision in the case of dome steps. 350 U.S.
318, 322. The majority also said that "considerations of administrative expertise
relevant to §3 [45 U.S.C. §12 (1952 ed.) providing for designation of standard
equipment by the I.C.C.] are not equally applicable to the effectuation of the
purpose of §2 [45 U.S.C. §11 (1952 ed.) requiring secure running boards]," 350
U.S. at 322, and then referred to the fact that both the carrier, the manufacturer
of the tank car and the railroad industry recognized that tank cars required secure
dome running boards, Id. at 323-324.
72 United States v. Boston & M. R.R., 168 Fed. 148 (D. Mass. 1909).
73 St. Joseph & G.I. Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 211 (1917); United States v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 184 Fed. 94 (W.D. Va. 1910); Lemee v. Texas & Pac. Ry.,
141 La. 769, 75 So. 676 (1917). It should be noted that in each of these cases
the alleged substitute was a coupling lever and that each opinion points out that
such a substitute does not in fact provide the same security which the required
grab iron or handhold would do. Itis also significant that United States v. Boston
& M. R.R., supra note 72, was not specifically overruled or rejected.
74 Act of February 17, 1911, §2, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §23 (1952 ed.) (em-
phasis added).
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the equipment of locomotives and tenders.7 Where, as in the case of
many boiler explosions, the accident is the result of negligent operation
of an otherwise safe locomotive, liability has been restricted to an action
for negligence rather than recovery under the "absolute" duty of the
Act. 6 Except where a specific appliance has been designated by the
I.C.C. as necessary to render a locomotive safe to operate, 77 the courts
have generally left it to the discretion of the carrier whether a specific
appliance is required by the Act.7 s As one opinion put it, "it cannot be
said that Congress intended that every gadget placed upon a locomotive
by a carrier, for experimental purposes, should become part thereof within
the rule of absolute liability."79  However, the courts have recognized
that the trier of fact may consider the available appliances which might
be used to render a locomotive "in proper condition and safe to operate." 80
In Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. s1 the Supreme Court appeared
75 See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398 (1936); Baltimore &
0. RR. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521 (1925) ; New Orleans & N. R.R. v. Scarlet, 249
U.S. 328 (1919); Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Smith, 256 Ala 220, 54 So.
Zd 453 (1951); Thornton v. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R., 187 Iowa 1158, 175 N.W.
71 (1919); O'Dea v. Byram, 176 Minn. 67, 222 N.W. 519 (1928); Slater v. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 146 Minn. 390, 178 N.W. 813 (1920); Banta v. Union Pac.
R.R., 362 Mo. 421, 242 S. W. 2d 34 (1951); Fryer v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 33 Mo.
740, 63 SAV. 2d 47 (1933), and cases therein cited; Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah
110, 138 P. 2d (1943), and cases therein cited.
76 E.g., Erie R.R. v. Lindquist, 27 F. 2d 98 (3d Cir. 1928) ; O'Dea v. Byram,
176 Minn. 67, 222 N.V. 519 (1928) ; Harlan v. Wabash Ry., 335 Mo. 414, 72 S.W.
2d 749 (1934) ; Fryer v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 330 Mo. 740, 63 S.W. 2d 47 (1933);
Riley v. Wabash Ry., 328 Mo. 910, 44- S.W. 2d 136 (1931); Ehalt v. McCarthy,
104 Utah 110, 138 P. 2d 639 (1943). Cf. Cochran v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 109
Kan. 303, 305, 198 Pa. 685, 686 (1921); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Stephens, 298 Ky.
328, 338, 182 S.W. 2d 447, 453 (1944).
77 See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 323 U.S. 574 (1945) ; Lilly v.
Grand Trunk Western Ry., 317 U.S. 481 (1943); Chicago Great Western R.R. v.
Rambo, 298 U.S. 100 (1936); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328,
182 S.W.2d 447 (1944). The I.C.C. is empowered to make regulations as to what
appliances are necessary for the safe operation of locomotives and tenders, Act
of February 17, 1911, §§2, 5, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§23, 28 (1952 ed.). As to
the effect of a failure to make a regulation, compare Great Northern Ry. v.
Donaldson, 246 U.S. 121(1918), with Southern Ry. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398
(1936). As to the limitations on the regulation making power of the I.C.C. see
also, United States v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 292 U.S. 454 (1935) ; Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
78 E.g., Southern Ry. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398 (1936) ; Baltimore & 0. R.R.
v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521 (1925); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Bower, 241 U.S. 470
(1916); Knox v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 95 Cal. App. 2d 896, 214 P. 2d 589
(1950). See, Gerow v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 189 N.C. 813, 818, 128 S.E. 345,
347-349 (1925).
79Southern Ry. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 402 (1936).
80 Great Northern Ry. v. Donaldson, 246 U.S. 121 (1918); Gerow v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry., 189 N.C. 813, 128 S.E. 345 (1925).
81317 U.S. 481 (1943).
1956]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
to broaden the scope of the Boiler Inspection Act to include a dangerous
condition resulting from the formation of ice on the top of a tender.
While the language of the opinion indicates that the Court did not feel
that mechanical defects were the sole bases for liability under the Act,
8 2
it should be noted that great reliance was placed on a rule of the I.C.C.
that "Top of tender behind fuel space shall be kept clean and means
provided to carry off waste water.""3 This rule makes it arguable that
the case really involved a matter of construction of the tender. Prior to
the Lilly decision, other courts had refused to allow recovery under the
Act based merely on the presence of foreign substances on the tender or
locomotive.8 4 In cases since Lilly the courts have generally followed
this earlier line of decision and granted recovery only where the danger-
ous condition arose from defective construction 85 or was the result of
a violation of a specific rule of the I.C.C. s8
The foregoing limitations on the Safety Appliance and Boiler In-
spection Acts indicate that the courts have taken into consideration the
practical problems of operating railroads within the terms of the Acts
in determining the extent of obligation placed on the carrier. Largely the
nature of the liability is to provide equipment which is mechanically
82 1d. at 487, 488. The jury had found, in answer to a special interrogatory,
that there was no leak in the collar of the manhole as alleged by the plaintiff,
so that there was no apparent mechanical defect present in the case
83 See 49 CODE FED. REGS. §91.153 (1949 ed.).
84 Ford v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 54 F. 2d 342 (2d Cir. 1931) (grease
on handrail); McGivern v. Northern Pac. Ry., 132 F. 2d 213 (8th Cir. 1942)
(snow on step); O'Dea v. Byram, 176 Minn. 67, 222 N.W. 519 (1928) (dust and
coal causing latch to stick); Reeves v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 147 Minn. 114,
179 N.W. 689 (1920) (piece of coal on step); Slater v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry., 146 Minn. 390, 178 N.W. 813 (1920) (misplaced bunker cover); Zacharitz
v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 336 Mo. 801, 81 S.W. 2d 608 (1935) (grease on handrail);
Riley v. Wabash Ry., 328 Mo. 910, 44 S.W. 2d 136 (1931) (misplaced clinker
hook); Tobin v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 57 Ohio App. 306, 13 N.E. 2d 739 (1937)
(frost on step).
85 See, e.g., Raudebush v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 160 F. 2d 363, 366 (3d Cir.
1917) ; Camp v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 251 Ala. 184, 36 So. 2d 331 (1948)
(recovery denied for grease on ladder where there was no defect in construction) ;
Banta v. Union Pac. R.R., 362 Mo. 421, 242 S.W. 2d 34 (1951) (icy condition
held to be violation of Act if due-to defective steam line).
S8The reliance on the I.C.C. regulation in the Lilly case was made the
distinguishing feature by the courts in Raudenbush v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 160
F. 2d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1947). Camp v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 251 Ala. 184,
189, 36 So. 2d 331, 335 (1948), and Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P. 2d
639, 644 (1943). In Banta v. Union Pac. R.R., 362 Mo. 241, 431, 242 S.W. 2d
34, 41 (1951), the court said that the Act itself contains the prohibition against
the use of a tender not in proper condition and safe to operate, and apparently
rejects the distinction made in the Raudenbush, Camp and Ehalt opinions. Note,
however, that in the Banta case there was apparently evidence of a mechanical
defect which created the hazardous condition, as distinguished from Raudenbush,
Camp and Ehalt.
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free from defects and which is adequate to perform the functions for
which it is intended. In the case of couplings between the locomotive
and tender, where the risk to be avoided originally appears relatively
slight, the courts have not given the Acts literal interpretations which
would increase considerably the burden of compliance on the carrier.
Second, even though the appliance or defect is the sort which the
Acts are intended to regulate, the courts appear to have recognized a
qualification of the "absolute" duty in terms of the appliance being
required to function only "when operated in an ordinary and reasonable
manner""7 or words to -that effect.88 The language of some opinions
apparently requiring that the appliances work "at all times" or "at any
time," 8 9 relates primarily to the question of whether the carrier may
plead and prove in defense that it has used all reasonable care to supply
adequate appliances.90
Most of the opinions which have recognized a qualification of the
duty imposed by the Safety Appliance Acts have had reference to the
requirement that cars be equipped with couplers which will couple auto-
matically upon impact. There have been indications that this does not
8 7 Popplar v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 121 Minn. 413, 416, 141 N.W.
798, 799 (1913), affd, 237 U.S. 369 (1915.)
88 Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 483 (1947) ("in the normal, natural
and usual manner"); Didinger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 39 F. 2d 798, 800 (6th Cir.
1930) ("under normal operation"); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., v. Linehan, 66
F. 2d 373, 381 (8th Cir. 1933) ("usual and customary manner") ; Western &
A. R.R. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282, 290, 291, 198 S.E. 257, 262-263 (1938), cert.
denied, 305 U. S. 654 (1938); St. Louis, S.W. Ry. v. Bounds, 244 S.W. 1099, 1102
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
8 0 Philadelphia & R. Ry., v. Auchenbach, 16 F. 2d 550, 552 (3d Cir. 1926);
Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Eisenhart, 280 Fed. 271, 276 (3d Cir. 1922); Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Muldowney, 130 F. 2d 971, 975 (Sth Cir. 1942); Thornson
v. Minneapolis & St L. R.R., 187 Iowa 1158, 1162, 175 N.W. 71, 73, 1919) ; Ala-
bama & V. Ry. v. Dennis, 128 Miss. 298, 301, 91 So. 4, 5 (1922). In Chicago,
RI. & P. Ry. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317, 320-321 (1912), the carrier conceded that
it was subject to a duty to supply couplers which would work "at all times,"
and in San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484- (1915), the Court
said that it need not determine whether the failure of the coupler "at any time"
would sustain a charge that the Act had been violated. Both of these statements
were noted and questioned in Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., v. Linehan, 66 F. 2d
373, 381 (8th Cir. 1933).
D9The court in Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Eisenhart, 280 Fed. 271, 276 (3d
Cir. 1922) said that prior cases had required that the appliance work "at all
limes" and cited St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 294, 295 (1908);
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 575, 576 (1911); Delk v.
St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 220 U.S. 580, 586, 587 (1911) ; Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 43 (1916); and United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 163 Fed.
517 (8th Cir. 1908). With the exception of the Delk case, none of the cases use
that precise language, and the citations in all cases refer to passages where the
court is passing on the question of whether use of reasonable care would satisfy
the requirements of the statute.
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mean that the coupling must occur on the first impact,9 and that it may
not apply where the cars have not been operated at a proper speed or
with proper force for coupling.9" Because of the necessity for rounding
curves, some lateral side play in the drawbars is permissible,9 3 and it
appears that a carrier may avoid liability under the Act by establishing
that the coupling was attempted at a place where the couplers would not
normally be in line with one another.9 Similarly, the failure of the
"pinlift lever" or coupling lever to open the knuckles of the coupler
is treated as a violation of the Act only where reasonable force has been
exercised on the lever.9 5 The three recent Supreme Court cases which
established the "absolute" nature of the duty under the Act, all gave at
least passing recognition to the fact that improper or unusual operation
of the equipment would not result in a violation.96 Where the alleged
91 See, Western & A. KR. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282, 291, 198 S.E. 257,
263 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 654 (1938); Ross v. Duluth, M. & I.R. Ry., 203
Minn. 312, 318, 281 N.W. 76, 80 (1938). An annotation in 16 A.L.R. 2d 654,
655 (1951) indicates that these cases may be in a minority relying on language
in Carter v. Atlantic & St. A. B. Ry., 338 U.S. 430, 433434 (194-9); Affolder. v.
New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96, 99 (1950); but as these cases contain
language referring to a proper manner of operation and as the Carter case does
not specifically reject the language of the Gentle opinion that failure to couple
on the first impact does not conclusively establish violation, the weight to be given
to the A.L.R. statement is not clear.
92 See, Western & A. R.R. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282, 295, 198 S.E. 257,
265 (1938).
93 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194-, 101 S.E. 415 (1919). See
also, Atlantic City R.R. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 56, 59 (1916) in which Mr. Justice
Holmes said, "Some lateral play must be allowed to drawheads."
94 Atlantic City R.R. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 56 (1916) ; Willett v. Illinois Central
R.R., 122 Minn 513, 142 N.W. 883 (1913) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Arrington, 126
Va. 194, 101 S.E. 415 (1919). Although a recent decision, Hallada v. Great
Northern Ry., 69 N.W. 2d 673, 681 (Minn. 1955), says that misalignment cannot
be a defense, its references to prior cases including Atlantic City R.R. v. Parker,
supra, indicate that the court may have been thinking in terms of an unreasonably
large lateral side play and attempts at coupling where the track was relatively
straight.
95 See, Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., v. Linehan, 66 F. 2d 373, 378-379 (8th
Cir. 1933). Cf. Stewart v. Southern R.R., 315 U.S. 283 (1942), where there was
no direct evidence of any attempt to use the lever.
96 O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384, 393 (1949): "The defendant
stressed evidence that in the switching operation the coupler broke concurrently
with an emergency stop. Such evidence might be material on the question of
negligence. But the Act certainly requires equipment that will withstand the
stress and strain of all ordinary operation . . . including emergency stops." Carter
v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry. 338 U.S. 430 434 (1949):" . . . the absence of a 'defect'
cannot aid the railroad if the coupler was properly set and failed to couple on
the occasioh in question" and in a footnote: "See Myers v. Reading Co. 331 U.S.
477 483 (1947). Respondent conceded in opposing certiorari that 'the Safety
Appliance Act was violated- . . . a coupling failed to couple on impact . . .,
That statement is apparently abandoned now, for the argument is that Carter
set the coupler improperly. On the record before us it is clear that this is a jury
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violation relates to the brakes, the courts have also referred to the
manner of operation. 7 And where a brakeman fell from a car when a
grab iron against which he had braced his foot for better leverage in
operating a hand brake gave way, the court pointed out that "use as a
foot brace was a natural and not unusual use.""8 All of these cases
indicate that while the courts will not recognize a defense of reasonable
care, they may be willing to limit the obligations of the Acts to situations
where the likelihood of injury from defective equipment is reasonably
foreseeable.
The Boiler Inspection Act has also been qualified in some cases by
distinguishing between dangerous conditions which are the normal in-
cidents of railroad operations and those which are not normally en-
countered. For example, the presence of grease on handholds or foot-
boards of locomotives and tenders has been treated as "a result of
normal operations," 9 9 and recovery denied on the ground that Cthe
operation of a railroad is necessarily attended by some danger."' 0 0 In
Banta v. Union Pacific R.R.,' the court reversed a judgment for an
employee injured by a slip on an icy tender on the basis that the in-
structions would have permitted the jury to find for the plaintiff even
though the icy condition arose from normal operations of the train
rather than from a defective steam line. On the other hand, in Reeves
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 92 the court denied recovery to an
employee injured by the presence of a piece of coal on a step because
this was not considered to be "the result of the ordinary use of such
instrumentalities" but the result of some unforeseen force. These de-
cisions may indicate a further limitation of the broad language of
Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 3 since there the ice should not
have accumulated under Cnormal conditions", i.e. compliance with the
question." Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96, 99 (1950):
"Of course this assumes that the coupler was placed in a position to operate on
impact. Thus, if 'the failure of these two cars to couple on impact was because
the coupler on the Pennsylvania car had not been properly opened,' the railroad
had a good defense."
09 See, Spokane & I. R.R. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 505 (1916); Didinger
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 39 F. 2d 798, 799 (6th Cir. 1930).
9s Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 294 U.S. 529, 532 (1935).
09 Camp v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 251 Ala. 184, 190, 35 So. 2d 331, 336
(1948); see also, McGivern v. Northern Pac. Ry. 132 F. 2d 213, 217 (8th Cir.
1942) (snow on step.)
100 Zachritz v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 336 Mo. 801, 807, 91 S.V. 2d 608, 611
(1935). O'Dea v. Byram, 176 Minn. 67, 222 N.W. 519 (1928), where recovery
was denied under the Act for injuries resulting from latch not moving out of the
way properly, might be explained in the same way since the latch may have
become "stuck" by a collection of dust and pieces of coal which could be a normal
consequence of operation.
101362 Mo. 421, 242 S.V. 2d 34 (1951).
102 147 Minn. 115, 179 N.W. 689 (1920).
103317 U.S. 481 (1943).
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I.C.C. regulation requiring that provision be made for carrying off waste
water, and yet the formation of ice was not an unforeseeable incident
of railroad operation in view of that very regulation.
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that in terming
the duty under the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts an
"absolute" one, the courts are intending only to eliminate the question
of whether failure to comply with the requirements of the Acts may be
excused by a showing of reasonable caie or reasonable efforts to supply
safe equipment.10 Yet in the process of determining whether there has
been a failure to comply, the courts allow the consideration of what is
normal operating procedure and what would be foreseeable results, both
of which seem to be elements which are usually related to the problem
of what is reasonable care.'0 5 The courts also leave the question of
compliance to the jury in many cases 00 which may permit the intro-
duction of more considerations of reasonableness. To this extent the
distinction between the nature of duty imposed under these acts and
under the FELA may be somewhat lessened.
It is also apparent that the scope of the safety acts is not overly
broad. The Safety Appliance Acts are limited to specific types of
appliances. The Boiler Inspection Act is limited to matters of con-
struction, although most defects, insufficiencies or inadequacies of equip-
ment would appear to fall within the terms of the Act. To this extent
the scope of protection offered to the injured party is more limited than
104 No amount of reasonable care may excuse a violation: Louisville & Jeffer-
sonville Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 534, 539 (1919); St. Joseph & G.I.
Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 311, 314 (1917); Delk v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 220 U.S.
580, 586-587 (1911) Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Beltz, 10 F. 2d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1925),
cert. denied, 270 U.S. 641 (1925); Chicago Junction Ry. v. King, 169 Fed. 372.
376-377 (7th Cir. 1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 222 (1911); Missouri-K.-T. KR. v. Ridge-
way, 191 F. 2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1951).
105 The "reasonable man" test appears to be an evaluation of whether serious
harm is foreseeable when a less harmful course of action is readily open. In
relation to the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts, once the serious harm
of injury to an employee or other person is foreseeable, the less harmful course
of action, i.e., compliance, is always open. In imposing the "absolute" duty the
courts seem only to be making the last part of this determination. It should be
noted, however, that they also have eliminated the question of notice of the
defect under the Acts, United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 287 Fed. 780, 783-784
(9th Cir. 1923) ; Banta v. Union Pac. R.R., 362 Mo. 421, 429, 242 S.V. 2d 34, 40
(1951).
100 See, e.g., Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry, 317 U.S. 481 (1943);
Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521 (1925); New Orleans & N.E. KR.
v. Scarlet, 249 U.S. 528 (1919); Spokane & I. R.R. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497
(1916) ; Western & A. R.R. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282, 198 S.E. 257 (1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 654- (1938); Poplar v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry.,
121 Minn. 413, 141 N.W. 798 (1913), aff'd, 237 U.S. 369 (1915). But ef. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937) saying that courts and juries
should not attempt to determine when there has been compliance if the I.C.C. has
notice of the condition and fails to make any regulations with regard to it.
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that found under the more general language of "negligence" in the
FELA, which may cover not only negligence in supplying equipment,
but lack of proper care in its operation, failure to give proper signals,
failure to properly light yards, etc.
Proof of Breach
Closely related to the question of the duty owed by the carrier is
the problem of proof of breach of that duty. Several of -the cases al-
ready mentioned have raised specific problems of this sort."' Although
the duties owed under the three acts are not identical, the types of proof
which may be used are not so different. Sometimes proof of a breach of
one of the safety acts is established by direct evidence of total absence
of a required appliance such as a coupler, drawbar or running board,108
the presence of a damaged appliance, 109 a specific defect in an air brake
line or a steam line which creates an obvious hazard,"0 an appliance
which breaks down under usage, 111 or an appliance such as a pin lift lever
which fails to open the coupler when operated in a normal fashion," 2 or
misalignment of couplers."' Likewise specific proof of non-compliance
with I.C.C. regulations and rules is sufficient to establish a violation of
107 See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384 (1949) (breaking
of coupling) ; Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 317 U.S. 481 (1943) (presence
of ice on tender top); Western & A. R.R. v. Gentle, 58 GaG. App. 282, 198 S.E.
257 (1937), cert, denied, 305 U.S. 654 (1938) (failure to couple); Chesapeake &
0. Ry. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 101 S.E. 415 (1919) (failure to double due
to misalignment).
108See, e.g., Lang v. New York Cent. R.R., 255 455 (1921) (entire coupler
assembling missing); St. Joseph & G.L Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 311 (1917) (grab-
iron missing); Great Northern Ry. v. Otos, 239 U. S. 499 (1915) (pin lift lever
missing) ; Williams v. New York Cent. R.R., 403 I1. 494, 84 N.E. 2d 399 (1948)
(running board missing); Cramer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 134 Minn. 61,
158 N.W. 796 (1916) (ladder rung missing).
109 See, e.g., Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521 (1925) (broken
staybolts, not cause of explosion); Chicago Junction Ry. v. King, 169 Fed. 372
(7th Cir. 1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 222 (1911) (broken knuckle) ; Bocook v. Louisville
& N. R.R., 67 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Ky. 1946) (broken coupler); Alabama. G. S.
R.R. v. Smith, 256 Ala. 220, 54 So. 2d 453 (1951) (loose peteock).
110 See, e.g., Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949); Compton
v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 267, 161 P. 2d 40 (1940); Banta v. Union
Pac. R.R., 362 Mo. 421, 242 S.V. 2d 34 (1951).
III See, e.g., Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 10 (1938) (grab iron
came loose); Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239 (1923) (grab iron came loose); Chi-
cago & N.,V. Ry. v. Bower, 241 U.S. 470 (1916) (bursting lubricator glass); El
Paso & S.V. R.R. V. Vizard, 211 U.S. 608 (1909) (rail slipped out of standard).
112 See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317 (1913) ; Chicago
M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Linehan, 66 F. 2d 373 (8th Cir. 1933).
113 See, e.g., Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Muldowney, 130 F. 2d 971
(8th Cir. 1942) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943); Davis v. Michigan Cnt. M.R.,
294 11. 355, 128 N.E. 539 (1920) ; Willett v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 122 Minn. 513,
142 NA.. 883 (1913).
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the Acts,' although proof of compliance does not always make a
complete defense.' 1 5 This specific proof under the safety acts is matched
by similar proof of specific acts of negligence under the FELA, such as
leaving a hatch open,"' or throwing a switch while the car on which
the plaintiff is riding is crossing 'it,"' or failure to check or maintain
proper water level in a boiler.118
Where there are specific provisions, such as the requirement of the
use of the couplers which will couple automatically on impact" 9 or the
use of efficient hand brakes,' 20 the failure of these appliances to function
efficiently is proof of violation of the statute. 121 It is unnecessary to
114 See, e.g., Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 317 U.S. 481 (1943) (failure
to keep top of fuel space clean) ; Louisville & N. R.R. v. Stephens, 294 Ky. 328,
182 SA. 2d 447 (1944) (defective water guage).
115 While compliance with the clearance regulations for ladders was suffi-
cient to avoid liability under the Safety Appliance Act in Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471 (1932) and compliance with the requirements as to
ladders and grab irons was sufficient in Davis v. Manry, 266 U.S. 401 (1925),
apparently on the ground that the situation was such that if the conditions were
in fact unsafe, the I.C.C. would have made that determination in setting
up the regulations, the Supreme Court in Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
350 U.S. 318 (1956) and the Court of Appeals in Bolan v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,
167 F. 2d 934 (2d Cir. 1948) found that something more than compliance would
be necessary. The court in the latter case said that compliance "did not relieve
appellant of its duty under the Boiler Inspection Act to maintain all appur-
tenances of its engines 'in proper condition and safe to operate 0 11 * that the
same may be employed in the active service of such carrier without unnecessary
peril to life or limb.' The Commission's regulation, . . . merely provides for the
number, dimensions, location and manner of application of such steps. A step
may comply 'with these directions and yet be in a highly dangerous condition
-because it is worn or bent . . . Accordingly, if an appurtenance conforms with
the I.C.C. regulations but nevertheless violates the Act, the latter must control."
167 F. 2d at 936. It would appear that in requiring "secure" ladders, steps and
grab irons, the Safety Appliance Act would also be violated even though there
were compliance with the regulations of the I.C.C. On the problem of compli-
ance with administrative regulations, see Morris, The Role of Administrative
Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEXAS L. REy. 143, 157-157 (1949), re-
printed in MoRRIs, STUDIES IN THE LAv OF TORTS, 182, 200 (1953).
116 Harlan v. Wabash Ry., 335 Mo. 414, 73 S.W. 2d 749 (1934).
117 Hutchins v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 162 F. 2d 189 (6th Cir. 1947).
118Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P. 2d 639 (1943).
119 See, e.g., Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96 (1950);
Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66 (1917); Spotts v. Baltimore
& 0. R.R., 102 F. 2d 160 (7th Cir. 1938); Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Mul-
downey, 130 F. 2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1942).
120 See, e.g., Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477 (1947) ; Spokane & I. R.R.
v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497 (1916); Didinger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 39 F. 2d 798
(6th Cir. 1930); Campbell v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. R.R., 122 F. Supp. 749 (W.D.
Pa. 1954).
121 As noted above, this assumes that the couplers have been placed in a
position to operate, Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 399 U.S. 96, 99 (1950) ;
Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 69 N.W. 2d 673, 680 (Minn. 1955), and that
the attempt to operate the brakes is in the normal manner, Spokane & I. R.R. v.
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show a specific defect in the appliance; if a coupler does not couple or
does not remain coupled the act is violated whether the cause of failure
is insufficiency of a pin lift lever, an overly stiff knuckle joint or a
broken knuckle. Some of the courts have spoken of this type of situation
as one in which something like "res ipsa loquitur" may be applied, 22 but
that term seems inappropriate. While it is true that an inference of lack
of care may be drawn from the failure to function properly, "negligence"
in the sense of lack of due care is irrelevant. These courts are really
faced only with a question of whether the appliance was efficient, and
proof of failure to function under normal circumstances is not merely
circumstantial evidence being used to establish the ultimate fact of lack
of care. This is in contrast to cases arising under the FELA, where
res ipsa loquitur may appropriately be applied to establish negligence.
123
It should be noted, however, that the question of "control" of -the in-
strumentality on the part of the carrier or on the part of the employee
may be of importance in determining liability under the Safety Appliance
Acts in some cases.
124
In cases involving more generalized requirements, 125 such as that
Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 505 (1916); Didinger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 39 F. 2d
798, 799 (6th Cir. 1930).
122 See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66, 67 (1917);
Didinger v. Pennsylvania R.R. 39 F. 2d 798, 799-800 (6th Cir. 1930); Eker v.
Pettibone, 110 F. 2d 451, 453-454 (7th Cir. 1940); Colwell v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.,
335 Mo. 494, 504, 73 S.W. 2d 222, 226-227 (1934).
123 See, e.g., Jesionowski v. Boston & M. R.R., 329 U.S. 552 (1947); Car-
penter v. Batlimore & 0. R.R., 109 F. 2d 375 (6th Cir. 1940); Long v. Union
Pac. R.R., 192 F. 2d 788 (Sth Cir. 1951) ; Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R.R., 135
F. 2d 101 (10th Cir. 1943); Cochran v. Pittsburgh & L. R.R. 31 F. 2d 769 (N.D.
Ohio 1923); Baltimore & 0. S.W. R.R., v. Hill, 84 Ind. App. 345, 148 N.E. 489
(1925), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1925); Sibert v. Litchfield & M. R., 155 Mo.
68, 159 S.V. 2d 612 (1941). It is probably significant that the cases in which
"res ipsa loquitur" language has been used in connection with the Safety Appliance
Acts have also been within the terms of the FELA.
124 In Risberg v. Duluth, M. & I. R. Ry., 233 Minn. 396, 47 N.WV. 2d 113
(1951), the court pointed out that a two day interval between delivery of the
car by the carrier-defendant into the hands of the plaintiff's employer and the
date of the accident prevented any inference of a defect at the time of delivery.
Compare Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944),
where proof of the type of care taken by persons handling a bottle which burst
overcame this problem in a straight res ipsa loqnitur case. On the other hand,
Eker v. Pettibone, 110 F. 2d 451, 453-455 (7th Cir. 1940), recognizes that the
"control" of the decedent engineer of the speed of the engine did not make him
in control or responsible for the proper functioning of the pony truck (guide
wheels on the locomotive) which jumped the track. In Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104
Utah 110, 138 P. 2d 639 (1943), the fact that Ehalt had been working with the
boiler for some time before the explosion was considered a crucial fact. Cf.
Jesionowski v. Boston & M. R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947).
125See, Fryer v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 333 Mo. 753-755, 63 S.W. 2d 47,
52-53 (1933) as to the distinction between the specific requirements of the Safety
Appliance Acts and the more generalized requirements of the Boiler Inspection
Act.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
the locomotive, tender and all appurtenances shall be safe to operate
without unnecessary peril to life or limb, the mere fact of an accident may
not give rise to an inference of violation of the safety acts. Boiler ex-
plosions do occur from causes other than defective boilers such as an
improper operation of an otherwise safe engine.' 26 A fall from a ladder
or car may give rise to an inference of a defect in construction or in one
of the appliances, but may also have resulted from other causes such as
ice or grease collecting on the car in the normal course of operations
which is not a violation of the safety acts.127 In such situations where
there are equally probable explanations of the accident which do not
involve violations of the Acts, the fact of accident is not treated as
sufficient proof for liability. This same view of equal probabilities of
non-negligent causes prevents the application of res ipsa loquitur in
FELA cases.1 2
EXTENT OF PROTECTION OFFERED-CARRIERS AFFECTED
In comparing the coverage of the three acts, it should be noted
that all of them apply only to common carriers by railroad engaged in
interstate commerce. This term has been interpreted fairly broadly, how-
ever, so as to include a terminal company which makes available facilities
to other interstate carriers, makes up and breaks up trains and switches
cars within the terminal yard;' 29 a railroad operated wholly within the
confines of the switch tracks of a single plant, but connecting with roads
engaged in interstate commerce and carrying goods which move in inter-
state commerce; 13 and a railroad operating within a single state, free
from any common management or control by other carriers, which
transports articles of commerce shipped in continuous passage between
the states.'13  An express company having a contract with a railroad under
126 Fryer v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 333 Mo. 740, 63 S.W. 2d 47 (1933); Ehalt
v. McCarthy, 104- Utah 110, 138 P. 2d 639 (1943).
127 See, e.g., Camp v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 251 Ala. 184, 36 So. 2d 331
(1948); Banta v. Union Pac. R.R., 362 Mo. 421, 242 S.W. 2d 34 (1951); Zachritz
v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 336 Mo. 801 81 S.W. 2d 608 (1935).
128 See, e.g., O'Mara v. Pennsylvania R.R., 95 F. 2d 762 (6th Cir. 1938);
Wadiak v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 208 F. 2d 925 (7th Cir. 1953); Dade v. Boston
& M. R.R., 92 N.H. 294, 20 A. 2d 485 (1943) ; Waller v. Northern Pac. Terminal
Co., 178 Ore. 274, 166 P. 2d 488 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
129 See, e.g., United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) ; Fort Street
Union Depot Co. v. Hillen, 119 F. 2d 307 (6th Cir. 1941); Belt Ry. Co. of Chicago
v. United States, 168 Fed. 542 (7th Cir. 1909); Maurice v. State, 43 Cal. App.
2d 270, 110 P. 2d 796 (1941).
130 Kenna v. Calumet, H. & S.E. R.R., 284 Il1. 301, 120 N.E. 259 (1918);
Devine v. Chicago & C.R. R.R., 259 Ill. 449, 102 N.E. 803 (1913).
131 United States v. Colorado & N.W., R.R., 157 Fed. 321 (8th Cir. 1907);
Pacific Coast R.R. v. United States, 173 Fed. 448 (9th Cir. 1909). But see, United
States v. Geddes, 131 Fed. 452 (6th Cir. 1904), where carriage of interstate
freight was done by the intrastate railroad on separate bills of lading and with
separate charges and the court found that it was not within the terms of the Acts.
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which -the railroad supplied the cars to be used by the express company
was not considered a common carrier by railroad within .the terms of the
Acts, on the ground that it did not in fact operate the trains.1 3 2 On the
other hand, the lessor of a line engaged in interstate traffic has been
held a proper defendant even though it has nothing to do with the actual
operation of the railroad."s
PERSONS COVERED
The persons who may bring an action under the FELA are limited
to employees of the carrier or their personal representatives. 134 The
courts have limited the category of "employees" to those in the relation
of servants to the carrier, i.e., those whom the carrier has the right to
control as to the manner in which work is done." 5 As a result, an indi-
vidual employed by a construction company which has contracted with
a carrier to do repair work on its lines with the company having personal
supervision of the work is not within the FELA.3 8 Employees of a
lessee or licensee of a track are not thereby employees of the owner so
that it may be held responsible for injuries.' 7 Express clerks or others
employed on express or mail cars carried 'by rail are not employees of
the carrier if under the supervision of the express company or the U. S.
Post Office itself.' 8 Where the Pullman Company operated Pullman
cars on its own, although they were carried on the regular trains, the
porter was not treated as an employee of the carrier;'3 9 but where the
Pullman cars were owned and operated by an association including both
the Pullman Company and the carriers, the porters were treated as em-
ployees.' 4 The fact that the injured individual is nominally employed
by an independent contractor may not prevent his being within the pro-
tection of the FELA if he is in fact subject to direction by the railroad
132aWells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1929); Latsko v. National
Carloading Corp., 192 F. 2d 905 (6th Cir. 1951).
183 North Carolina K.R. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248 (1914).
13 4 Act of April 22, 1908 §1, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952 ed.) It should be noted
that personal representatives may maintain the action only for the benefit of the
surviving spouse or children of the employee.
135 Dougall v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 207 F. 2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 904 (1954) ; Illinois Cent. R.JL v. Johnston, 205 Ala. 1, 7, 87 So.
866, 871-872 (1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 654 (1921).
136 Dougall v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 207 F. 2d 843 (9th Cir. 1953), 'cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 904 (1954); Norman v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 101 F. Supp. 305
(D. Ore. 1950), afd, 192 F. 2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
945 (1952).
137 Hull v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 252 U.S. 475 (1920); Chicago & A.
R.R. v. Wagner, 239 U.S. 452 (1915); Griffith v. Gardner, 358 Mo. 859, 217 S.
,V. 2d 519 (1949); Robertson v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry., 159 F. 2d 31 (5th Cir. 1947).
138 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Norfolk & W. Ry.
v. Hall, 57 F. 2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1932); Jones v. New York Cent. R.R., 182 F.
2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950).
139Robinson v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 237 U.S. 84 (1915).
14 Oliver v. Northern Pac. Ry., 196 Fed. 432 (E.D. Wash. 1912).
1956]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
or its agents at the time of injury.141 Where a car and its crew were
loaned from one company to another, the crew members became em-
ployees of the borrowing company for the purposes of the Act."4 Indi-
viduals who are not in fact paid by the carrier, but who are called upon
to assist trainmen in emergencies or unusual situations have been treated
as employees.143
While the preambles to the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection
Acts refer only to "employees and travelers upon railroads", the Acts
have been applied to cover not only employees of the carrier whose equip-
ment causes the injury, but employees of shippers,144 independent con-
tractors,145 and employees of other carriers engaged in inspecting the
car before its acceptance by the carrier.14' Not only have travelers on
the railroads been granted recovery, 147 but persons travelling on the
highways who become involved in collisions with defectively equipped
trains have recovered under the Acts. 48
The distinction in coverage between the Acts is also apparent from
the requirement that in order to recover under the FELA the plaintiff
must show that the accident occurred while the employee was engaged
in interstate commerce. Before 1939, the courts had broadened the scope
of the Act somewhat by inding that if the employee's work was a
necessary part of the whole operation called "interstate commerce" he
141 Cimorelli v. New York Cent. R.R., 148 F. 2d 575 (6th Cir. 1945); Downs
v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 345 Ill. App. 118, 102 N.E. 537 (1951); Benjamin v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 112 N.Y.S. 2d 824 (1952).
142Linstead v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 276 U.S. 28 (1929).
143 Baltimore & 0. S. W. R.R., v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 540 (1924) (owner help-
ing to unload heavy equipment) ; O'Neal v. Vie 94 Okla. 68, 220 Pac. 853 (1923)
(bystander assisting in wreck situation).
1 44 Rush v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 568, 202 S.W. 2d 800 (1947). In Paul v.
Duluth, M. & I.R. Ry., 96 F. Supp. 578 (D. Minn. 1950), and Risberg v. Duluth,
M. & I.R. Ry., 233 Minn. 396, 47 N.W. 2 113 (1951), recovery was denied on
the ground that the cars were not being used or hauled on the line of the
defendant, but had they been so, used or hauled the fact that the plaintiffs were
employees of a quarry company to whom the cars were being delivered ap-
parently would not have barred recovery. In Floyd v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 250,
201 S.W. 2d 390 (1947) recovery was denied not on the basis that the shipper
was not a person within the scope of protection but on the basis of contributory
negligence.
145 Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 350 U.S. 318 (1956).
146 Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 10, (1938). In Patton v. Baltimore
& 0. R.R., 197 F. 2d 732 (3d Cir. 1952), the employee of the receiving carrier
was denied recovery on the ground that the car was not being used or hauled
on the defandant's lines, and distinguished the Brady case on this ground.
147 Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 206 F. 2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953);
Srabic v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R.R., 42 Ohio App. 473, 182 N.E. 528 (1932).
148 Fairport, P. & E. R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934); Scott v. Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. Ry., 197 F. 2d 259 (8th Cir. 1952); Brown v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry., 108 F. Supp. 164 (N. D. Iowa 1952).
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might recover.14 9 For example, a switchman who moved a string of
cars so that an interstate carload of hogs was placed on the proper track
for forwarding after a temporary delay was held within the act,
1 50
though moving of an empty car after an interstate movement in the
course of returning it to the owner was held not to bring the employee
within the FELA.'5 Where plaintiff was employed in alteration and
repair of bridges and tracks used in interstate commerce, the Supreme
Court said that he was so closely related to the conduct of commerce
that he was protected. 152 And in 1939 all doubt was removed as to the
extent of protection, when the FELA was amended to include as "em-
ployees engaged in interstate commerce":
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be in the furtherance of interstate or foreign
commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and sub-
stantially, effect such commerce.
11
3
Or as one early case put it: "Was the relation of the employment
to interstate commerce such that the personal injury to him tended to
delay or hinder the movement of a train engaged in interstate com-
merce?," 154  Contrasted with these requirements of some relation to
interstate commerce under the FELA are the current provisions of the
Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts which apply to all cars
whether used in interstate or intrastate commerce. 55
149 Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 299 U.S. 146, 152 (1913).
1 5 0 Leuthe v. Erie R.R., 12 F. Supp. 161 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
151 Ewing v. Coal & Coke Ry., 82 W. Va. 427, 96 S.E. 73 (1918).
1 5 2 Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 299 U.S. 146, (1913).
153 Act of August 11, 1939, s 1, 45 U.S.C. §51 (second paragraph) (1952 ed.)
54 Lamphere v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 195 Fed. 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1912).
15r The 1903 Safety Appliance Act referring to "all trains, locomotives,
tenders, cars and similar vehicles used" has been interpreted as applying the
provisions of the Safety Appliance Acts to intrastate commerce, Gilvary v. Cuya-
hoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57 (1934); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916) ; Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911).. The 1924 rewording
of the Boiler Inspection Act, Act of June 7, 1924, §2, 45 U.S.C. §23 (1952 ed.)
which dropped all reference to the fact that the locomotives covered were those
used "in moving interstate or foreign trafic" seems not to have received much
attention from the courts, perhaps because it was already well established that
Congress had the power to make safety requirements for carriers engaged in
interstate commerce which would apply to intrastate cars, see Southern Ry. v.
United States, supra, and Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, supra. State statutes at-
tempting to set up safety requirements similar to those of the Boiler Inspection
Act and the I.C.C. regulations under it have been declared invalid as in conflict
with the federal requirements, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605
(1926), but outside of such conflict, state regulation has been permitted, Terminal
R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943) See also,
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Vandalia R.R. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255 (1916) Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234
U.S. 280, 290 (1914), upholding state legislation, and Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public
Service Commn', 250 U. S. 566 (1919); Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n of
Indiana, 236 U.S. 439 (1915), overthrowing legislation in conflict with federal
legislation.
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USED OR HAULED ON ITS LINES
A requirement does exist as to the Safety Appliance and Boiler
Inspection Acts which bears some resemblance to that of the FELA
regarding injuries in interstate commerce, namely that the car or loco-
motive must be used or hauled on the line of the carrier. Under such
provisions, which vary in terminology from one section to another,'5
cars which have been placed in repair shops or on heavy repair tracks
are generally treated as not "in use." ' 7  On the other hand, a car
which has been found to be defective and has been placed on a side
track to be sent to a repair yard apparently remains "in use" until it in
fact reaches the ultimate point of repair.' Also where a car has been
moving in interstate commerce and is undergoing light repairs on a
main or switch track, it has been held to remain "in use."' 9 A car
standing on a siding between two interstate trips has not been withdrawn
from use, 160 and if it is loaded with interstate freight the fact that it
may be placed on a side track for repair purposes does not take it out of
use. 1"' These cases illustrate that, as the courts extended the interstate
commerce requirements of FELA, so they have given a broad inter-
pretation to this requirement of the safety acts.
156The language used in the various sections is as follows: 45 U.S.c. §1
'to use on its line, . . . to run any train"; §2 "to haul or permit to be hauled
or used on its line"; §4- "to use"; §5 "shall be used"; §6 "running any train,
or hauling or permitting to be hauled or used on its line any car"; §7 "in use ...
the unlawful use"; §8 "used on any railroad . . . used in connection"; §9 "any
train is operated"; §11 "to haul, or permit to be hauled or used on its line";
§13 "hauling, or permitting to be used or hauled on its line" ... ".such movement
or hauling or hauling . . . the movement or hauling"; §23 "to use or permit to
be used on its line".
157 E.g., Sherry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 30 F. 2d 487 (3d Cir. 1929) ; Balti-
more & 0. MR. v. Hooven, 297 Fed. 919 (6th Cir. 1924); Kaminski v. Chicago,
M., St. P. & P. R.R., 190 Minn. 519, 231 N.W. 189 (1930). Apparently even
preparation for sending the locomotive out is not treated as "use" since in both
Baltimore & 0. MR. v. Hooven, supra, and Harlan v. Wabash Ry., 335 Mo. 414,
73 S.W. 2d 749 (1934) the locomotive was on the "go out" track in preparation
for departing.
158 E.g., Chicago Great Western MR. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287 (1925) Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). It is for this reason that in spite of some
doubts expressed in Lang v. New York Cent. R.R., 255 U.S. 455, 458 (1921),
the defective car in St. Louis & S.F. MR. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243 (1915), which
was standing on the line waiting to be switched onto an isolated track to await
repairs, was "in use on the line."
159 Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406 (1926);
Chicago Junction Ry. v. King, 169 Fed. 372 (7th Cir. 1909), aff'd 222 U.S. 222
(1911); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Voelker, 129 Fed. 522 (8th Cir. 1904) ; Blazin
v. Southern Pac. Co., 127 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
160Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1 (1904); Fort Street Union
Depot Co. v. Hillen, 119 F. 2d 307 (6th Cir. 1941); Johnson v. Great Northern
Ry., 179 Fed. 64-3 (8th Cir. 1910).
161 Great Northern Ry. v. Otos, 239 U.S. 349 (1915) ; Delk v. St. Louis
& S.F. R.R., 220 U.S. 580 (1911).
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In addition to the question of whether the car is in use, the require-
ment of the safety acts is satisfied only if it is in use on the defendant
carrier's lines. For example, in Brady v. Wabash R.R.,16 2 an inspector
for the Wabash R.R. was injured while examining cars which had not
yet been accepted by his company. He was denied recovery on the
ground that these cars were not yet in use on the Wabash line. How-
ever, he then was able to go against the delivering carrier and recover
on the ground that until acceptance, the cars were in use on its line.'
63
Where a car in the possession of the Boston & Maine R.R. was being
uncoupled from another car which the Canadian Pacific Ry. was picking
up, it was treated as "in use" by Canadian Pacific even though it had
not been accepted for carriage by that line."' On the other hand, once
a car has been accepted by a second carrier 6 . or a shipper 6 the courts
are apt to treat it as not "in use" on the first carrier's line. There are
some exceptions to this: where a car was being unloaded on a govern-
ment siding over which the carrier had an exclusive right to operate
trains, the siding was treated as part of the main line; 167 where a car
had been unloaded on a private industry track and was being switched
off this track by the carrier's employees, it was treated as in effect being
used on the defendant's line;' 6 where a car was delivered to a shipper
on a spur attached to the carrier's lines, the shipper was treated as under
the Safety Appliance Act;' 6 9 and where an independent contractor was
employed to unload gasoline by the consignee while the tank car was
sitting in freight yards, he was allowed to recover under the Safety
Appliance Act.110 The latter two cases may be distinguished from the
others on the ground that the car was not in the hands of one who owned
the track nor one who normally operated trains over the track, and
162 329 Mo. 1123, 49 SAV. 2d 24 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 619 (1932).
163 Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 10 (1938).
164 Cusson v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 115 F. 2d 430 (2d Cir. 1940). It should
be noted that when the statute refers to use on "its line," the courts interpret
this to cover operations on the tracks belonging ro another carrier. United States
v. New York Cent. R. R, 70 F. Supp. 761 (N.D.N.Y. 1946); Hood v. Baltimore
& 0. R.R., 302 Mo. 609, 259 S.V. 471 (1924). Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 189 F. 2d 749 (8th Cir. 1951).
16r Patton v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 197 2d 832 (3d Cir. 1952). But opera-
tion by an "agent" on its lines may be within the provisions of the acts, see
Hood v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 302 Mo. 609, 259 S.W. 471 (1924).
160 Paul v. Duluth, M. & I.R. Ry., 96 F. Supp. 578 (D. Minn. 1950); Risberg
v. Duluth, M. & I. Ry., 233 Minn. 396, 47 N.W 2d 113 (1951).
167Rush v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 568, 202 S.W. 2d (1947).
168 Geraghty v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 70 F. 2d 300 (2d Cir. 1934); Gray v.
Louisville & N. M.R., 197 Fed. 874 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1912); Lovett v. Kansas
City Terminal Ry., 316 Mo. 1246, 295 S.W. 89 (1927); Cf. Sprankle v. Thompson,
243 S.V. 2d 510 (Mo. 1951) (track was constructed by carrier and it appears
to have been the only company operating trains over it).
169 Floyd v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 250, 201 S.V. 2d 390 (1947).
170 Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 350 U.S. 318 (1956).
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therefore the car may remain in use on the main line even though con-
trol has passed into the hands of others than the carrier.
The distinction which the courts have apparently drawn between
some sidings which are treated as part of the main line of the defendant,
and shipper's tracks which are treated as different from the defendant
carrier's lines, has been criticised on the ground that in either case the
railroad is in the best position to inspect and insure that the equipment is
safe within the meaning of the acts." 1 It is true that the primary pur-
pose of the acts, as interpreted by the courts to impose an absolute duty,
is to compel the carrier to make proper inspections and supply proper
equipment. It seems arguable, however, that to impose such a duty
where the car involved has in fact passed out of the hands of the carrier
and into the hands of some other operator who may make inspections as
easily as the carrier, and who may in fact have caused the damage to the
equipment, is to go beyond the objectives of the acts. At least the cases
seem to so indicate.17 2
Causal Relation
There is little question but that in order to recover under any of
the three acts, the plaintiff must show that in fact there is some causal
relation between the violation of the act (either in terms of supplying
or using defective equipment or in terms of negligence action or inaction)
and the injuries which he has suffered3 7' The courts require something
more than a mere showing that but for the violation the injury could
not have occurred, i.e. that the violation must have been "a substantial
factor" in producing the injury." 4 Although the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Coray v. Southern Pacific CoY.15 might at first appear to reject
171 Louisell and Anderson, The Safety Appliance Act and the FELA: A
Plea for Clarification, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 281, 285-288 (1953).
,172 Patton v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., supra note 165, Paul v. Duluth, M. & I.L
Ry., supra note 166, and Risberg v. Duluth, M. & S.R. Ry., supra note 166. It should
be pointed out that in the eases involving injuries on shipper's sidings, with the
exception of the Rush and Floyd cases, supra notes 167, 169. the injuries appear
to have occurred to employees of the carrier who were engaged in switching the
cars as part of the interstate transportation of the cars. Rush seems to be treated
as exceptional by the later cases in view of the fact that the carrier was the only
person authorized to operate as a carrier over the lines. In Floyd, the carrier
seems to have conceded that it was subject to the Act and argument centered on
the problem of contributory negligence.
173 See, Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949) (Safety Appliance
Acts); Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry., 321 U. S. 29 (1944) (FELA); Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1942) (Boiler Inspection Act).
3-74johnson v. Chicago, Great Western Ry., 64 N.W. 2d 372 (Minn. 1954).
That the cause must be "proximate" has been recognized under all of the acts:
Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry., 321 U.S. 29 (1944); Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S.
239 (1923) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Wells, 49 F. 2d 251 (6th Cir. 1931) ; Ala-
bama Great Southern Ry. v. Smith, 256 Ala. 220, 54 So. 2d 453 (1951).
175335 U.S. 520 (1949).
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this requirement, a closer analysis indicates that the Court is not so much
rejecting the "substantial factor" test as it is saying that the meaning of
that term must be interpreted in the light of a Congressional intention
to grant protection to employees. Therefore, where defective equipment
caused the train to stop suddenly, which in turn produced a collision be-
tween the motor car upon which the decedent was riding and the stalled
train, it could not be said as a matter of law that no substantial con-
nection existed between the violation of the Safety Appliance Act and
the death of the plaintiff's decedent.
It might be argued that there is some distinction between the re-
quirements of causal relation under the FELA and the requirements
under the safety acts taken alone, since the former refer to injuries
resulting "in whole or in part" from negligence,' 6 while the latter
contain no such language and are interpreted as subject to state law
where not combined with the FELA7 7 and the state law way include
rules as to proximate cause."' 8 It is true that under the FELA the courts
have made it clear that the negligence of the carrier, its officers, agents
and employees need not be the sole cause of injury but that it is sufficient
that such negligence contributes substantially to the injury.'79 But in one
of the non-FELA cases arising under the Safety Appliance Acts, the
court made it clear that there might be more than a single "proximate
cause" of an injury, and that either of two contributing causes might be
treated as proximate,' a view which seems to be generally accepted
today. 18
Related to the problem of whether the violation of the duty im-
posed upon the carrier was a substantial factor in producing injury is the
question of an intervening cause which may or may not be treated as
sufficiently independent of the violation to prevent a finding of "proxi-
mate cause." Here the acts of the injured party himself become rele-
vant. Under the FELA, contributory negligence is never a complete
bar to recovery, and in the case of violation of the safety acts is not
considered at all.'8 2 The plaintiff cannot be prevented from recovering
so long as the jury finds that the negligence of the carrier is a con-
176 Act of April 22, 1908, §1, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952 ed.).
177 Mooroe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U. S. 205, 214-215 (1934) ; Gilvary
v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 202 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1934).
178 See Louisell and Anderson, The Safety Appliance Act and the FELA:
A Plea for Clarification, 18 LAw & CONTENIP. PROB. 2S1, 283 (1953). But note that
such cases as Louisville & N. R.R. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917) and Lang v.
New York Cent. R.R., 255 U.S. 455 (1921) in which the Supreme Court purports
to lay down rules of "proximate cause" for actions under the safety acts, were
in fact not within the terms of the FELA.
179 Eglsaer v. Scandarett, 151 F. 2d 562, 565-566 (7th Cir. 1945); Bocook v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 67 F. Supp. 154, 156-157 (E.D. Ky. 1946).
180 Floyd v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 250, 255-256, 201 S.W. 2d 390, 393 (1947).
181 See, PROSSER, TORTS 222, 254-255 (2d Ed. 1955).
192 Act nf April 22. 1908, §3, 45 U.S.C. §53 (1952 ed.).
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tributing factor,' 3 -but if the plaintiff's own acts are sufficiently un-
related to the negligence or violation of the safety acts, the court may
treat it as the sole cause of injury and deny recovery. 184 It appears that
where the plaintiff's acts are stimulated by the defective condition of
the equipment, the courts are unlikely to find them to be the sole cause
of injury.185 If the action cannot be brought within the terms of the
FELA, contributory negligence may remain as a defense under the
Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts8 0 and may therefore bar
recovery without reference to whether plaintiff's acts constitute "a super-
seding cause."
The acts of third parties may be treated as superseding causes.
Although the FELA speaks in terms of injuries resulting "in whole or
in part" from negligence, the courts have recognized the doctrine of
superseding causes.187 In an action under the Safety Appliance Acts,
the court refused recovery where the insecure nature of the step was
due to the acts of a third party.' Although the defense of the "fellow
servant" doctrine may not be available as such under these acts' 89 it
would appear that if the fellow servant's acts were such as to constitute
a superseding cause, liability under the safety acts would be cut off. 90
It appears, therefore, that so far as actual causal relation is con-
cerned there is no serious or substantial difference between the require-
ments of the different acts.
188 See, e.g., Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Achenbach, 16 F. 2d 550, (3rd Cir.
1926); McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 F. 2d 877 (7th Cir. 1946); Hallada
v. Great Northern Ry., 69 N.W. 2d 673 (Minn. 1955); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Thomas, 21 Ariz. 355, 188 Pac. 268 (1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 576 (1921).
184 See, eg., Southern Ry. v. Peters, 194 Ala. 94, 69 So. 611 (1915) ; Powell
v. Waters, 55 Ga. App. 307, 190 S.E. 615 (1937). See also Galveston, H. & S.A.
Ry. v. Kurtz, 147 S.W. 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
185 Erie R.R. v. Caldwell, 46 F. 2d 50 (6th Cir. 1931); Minneapolis St.
P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Goneau, 264 Fed .947 (6th Cir. 1920); Alabama Great Southern
R.R. v. Smith, 256 Ala. 220, 54- So. 2d 453 (1951).
186 See discussion of contributory negligence as a defense to these acts,
infra pp. 530-533.
187 See, e.g., Morse v. Pennsylvania R.R. 74 F. 2d 677 (2d Cir. 1935); Powell
v. Edwards, 117 Fla. 114, 157 So. 427 (1934); Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C.
530, 174, S.E. 443 (1934); Paris & G. N. Ry. v. Stafford, 53 S.W. 2d 1019 (Tex.
Comm., App. 1932); Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Rowe, 69 S.W. 2d 169 (Tex. Civ.
App. 154).
188 Slater v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 146 Minn. 390, 178 N.W. 813
(1920).
189 See discussion of this defense below pp. 533-534.
190 In Johnson v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 64 N.W. 2d 372 (Minn. 1954-)
the break in the coupling apparatus was not held to be a substantial factor, but
the question of whether the action of the conductor was not substantial was left
to the jury. It would appear that the latter might be called an intervening and
superseding act. It also seems possible that under the Boiler Inspection Act the
negligent openation of the boiler by the employees of the railroad might be super-
seding causes cutting off liability for use on the line of a boiler which proves
unsafe due to lack of proper water.
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NATURE OF ACCIDENT OR INJURY
In addition to the question of causal relation mentioned above,
the courts also talk of "proximate cause" when they are dealing with
the scope of the risk for which the carrier should be liable if it violates
the safety acts. Inasmuch as the obligation imposed by the federal
statutes is uniformly treated as a matter of federal law,' 91 it is not too
surprising that the leading cases in this area make no particular dis-
crimination between FELA and non-FELA situations, although the
courts are equally clear that the safety acts do not create a separate
federal cause of action.
192
The general view with regard to civil liability based upon a vio-
lation of a statutory duty is that the only injuries which should be
treated as "proximately caused" by such violation are thcse which the
statute was intended to prevent,10 3 with some tendency upon the part
of the courts to read the statutory purpose rather narrowly.1
94
Since the major evils to be avoided by the Safety Appliance Acts
were injuries resulting from brakemen having to go onto the cars in
order to control brakes and injuries resulting from employees going
between the cars in the process of coupling and uncoupling,'95 it is not
too surprising to find that the courts have thought in terms of limiting
recovery to injuries resulting from these types of conduct. In St. Louis
& San Francisco R.R. v. Cotarty, '6 for example, the employee was
riding a switch engine which collided with a loaded freight car lacking
coupler and drawbar and he was crushed between the two, although had
the freight car been properly equipped there would have been sufficient
space to avoid such crushing. The Supreme Court reversed judgment
for the plaintiff, pointing out that the purpose of the requirement of
191 Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Jacobson v. New
York, N. H. & H. Ry., 206 F. 2d 153, 157 (1st Cir. 1953).
102 Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57 (1934); Jacobson v. New
York, N.H. & H. R.R., 206 F. 2d 153, 156-157 (1st Cir. 1953).
193 See, MoUis, ToRTs 180 (1953); PROSSm, ToTS 155 (2d Cir. 1955).
194The leading case on this point appears to be Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex.
125 (1874), where the plaintiff's sheep were washed overboard and lost due to
defendant-shipowner's failure to comply with an order pursuant to the Contageous
Diseases (Animals) Act requiring that animals shipped to Great Britain from
abroad should be confined in pens. The Court of Exchequer interpreted the Act
and order as designed to prevent the exposure of animals to disease rather than
to prevent their exposure to the danger of being washed overboard, and denied
recovery. Similar results have occurred as to statues requiring elevator shafts
to be guarded for the benefit of employees, Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L.
35S, 59 At. 23 (1904); statutes requiring that railroads fence their rights of
way against cattle, where children have gotten on the tracks, Di Caprio v. New
York Central R.R., 231 N.Y. 94, 131 N.E. 746 (1921); and statutes requiring
drivers of motor vehicles to be licensed, Mandell v. Dodge-Freedman Poultry
Co., 94 N.H. 1, 45 A. 2d 577 (1946).
196238 U.S. 243 (1915).
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couplers and draw bars was to prevent the risk involved in employees
going between the cars for coupling and uncoupling and that there was
no basis for saying that the provisions were intended to provide a place
of safety between colliding cars. Since the decedent had not been en-
gaged in coupling with or handling the crippled car, he was not one as
to whom the absence of the coupler would operate as a breach of duty.
Shortly thereafter, in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Layton, 97
the Court affirmed a judgment of a Georgia court in favor of a switch-
man who had been injured while standing on top of one of five cars
which were to be coupled to a switch engine and stock car, and which
in fact did not couple but were set in motion and collided with a
standing train. The Court said here that the purpose of the Act was
to protect employees in general, although the immediate occasion for
its passage had been the large number of deaths caused by employees
going between cars, and that
... the liability in damages to employees for failure to comply
with the law springs from its being made unlawful to use cars
not equipped as required, not from the position that the employee
may be in or the work which he may be doing at the moment
he is injured."' 8
Of the Conarty case, the Court said, "it was not claimed that the
collision resulting in the injury complained of was proximately at-
tributable to a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts. .. .""' In the
same term, the Court also affirmed recovery under the FELA for the
death of a brakeman who was proceeding along the tops of cars on a
moving train and was thrown from the train when a defective coupler
parted resulting in the sudden setting of the automatic brake. 00
The cases of Lang v. New York Central R.R. 20 ' in which an
employee riding on a freight car to stop it before it reached a cripple
did not stop it and was crushed between the cars due to the lack of
coupler and drawbar on the crippled, standing car, where recovery was
denied, and Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 2 in which the decedent was
following a train on a motor car and collided with the train due to the
sudden stopping of the latter resulting from defective equipment, where
recovery was allowed, lead to the conclusion that the scope of protection
may be limited to injuries occurring to persons who are somehow con-
nected with the movement or use of the crippled or defective car. This is
borne out by the statement in the Lang case that it was like Conarty in
that in neither case was the movement of the car on which the employee
was riding directed toward moving or coupling with the cripple.20 3
197243 U.S. 617 (1917).
198 Id. at 621.
199 Id. at 620.
200 Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66 (1917).
201255 U.S. 455 (1921).
202 335 U.S. 520 (1949).
203 Lang v. New York Central R.R., 255 U.S. 455, 461 (1921)
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And in Davis v. Wolfe,204 which did not involve a collision but did
involve the use of a defective appliance by the employee, the Supreme
Court summarized the holdings of the Conarty, Lang and Layton cases
as making a distinction between violations which caused the accident in
which the plaintiff was hurt and violations which merely created a
situation in which the accident, otherwise caused, resulted in injury.
In non-collision cases, similar reasoning is found. In Minneapolis
St. Paul & Sault Sainte Marie Ry. v. Goneau, °5 the plaintiff was
granted recovery where he fell from a bridge while attempting to repair
a defective coupler. In Erie R.R. v. Caldwell20 6 plaintiff was injured
when he jumped on moving cars in an attempt to stop them after a
coupler had broken, and recovery was allowed. On the other hand, in
Reetz v. Chicago & Eastern R.R.,2 °7 where broken couplers caused the
train to stop and plaintiff fell from a bridge while walking along the
train to locate the brake, recovery was denied on the ground that the
defect created only an "incidental condition" in which other causes pro-
duced the accident. The Goneau and Caldwell decisions were dis-
tinguished on the ground that there the accidents were directly connected
with attempts to repair the coupler or prevent damage resulting from
the movement caused by the defective coupler. Apparently the courts
are requiring that the employee must be working with the defective
equipment itself to be within the scope of risk, but where an engineer
attempted to repair a hot air pump and the resulting overheating and
overexertion resulted in his death, the court found that the defective air
pump was not the proximate cause of injury.20 8
The apparent scope of the Boiler Inspection Act is broader, in view
of its requirement of equipment which is "in proper condition and safe
to operate . . . without unnecessary peril to life or limb." 20 9 However,
the cases in which recovery has been allowed under this Act seem to
involve some use or operation of the defective equipment: In Urie v.
Thompson,2 0 the fireman was subjected to silicon dust while working
on engines equipped with defective sanders; in Bolan v. Lehigh Valley
R.R.,211 the plaintiff was attempting to step onto a worn pilot step;
in Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Beltzi' 2 the conductor was riding in the cab
of a train whose boiler exploded; in Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Huben,2 13
the plaintiff was injured when the runaway engine in the Beltz case
204263 U.S. 239, 243 (1923).
205269 U.S. 406 (1926).
206264 Fed. 947 (6th Cir. 1920).
20746 F. 2d 50 (6th Cir. 1931).
20sPowell v. Waters, 55 Ga. App. 307, 190 S.E. 615 (1937).
209 Act of February 17, 1911, §2, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §23 (1952 ed.).
210337 U.S. 163 (1949).
211 167 F. 2d 934 (2d Cir. 1948).
212 10 F. 2d 74 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 641 (1925).
210 10 F. 2d 78 (2d Cir. 1925).
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crashed into the train on which he was working; in Alabama Great
Southern R.R. v. Smith, 14 the plaintiff was engaged in making repairs
on the defective engine.
While cases under both of these acts indicate that the protection
offered extends beyond the precise operations which originally gave rise
to their enactment, the plaintiff must still establish that the injury re-
sulted from movement or use of the defective equipment. Such limita-
tion is undoubtedly justified in view of the requirement of the acts that
the car be "in use" or being hauled on the line of the carrier.
21 5
The FELA is broader than the safety acts in that it encompasses
any injury resulting while the employee is engaged in interstate com-
merce or some activity closely connected therewith, and is not confined
to injuries resulting from defective equipment. It would appear, there-
fore, that so long as the plaintiff or his decedent falls within the category
of employees covered the general principles of determining the scope of
liability in terms of the foreseeable risk involved in the activity2 10 would
be applicable.
Another problem of the nature of injuries covered by the acts was
presented in Urie v. Thompson,"' although not in terms of "proximate
cause." There the plaintiff had been employed as a fireman on the
Missouri Pacific lines for many years and had contracted silicosis. He
brought action under the FELA claiming that the silicosis resulted from
excessive amounts of sand being thrown onto the tracks by faulty sanders,
where it was ground into fine dust and blown into the cab where plaintiff
worked. The Supreme Court of Missouri originally held that there was
not sufficient showing of notice on the part of the carrier to maintain an
action for negligence under the FELA but that the complaint might be
amended to allege a violation of the Boiler Inspection Act.21 The
plaintiff amended his complaint to allege in more detail a violation of
the Boiler Inspection Act and recovered in a jury trial in which the
issue of negligence was not submitted to the jury. The Missouri Supreme
Court then reversed on the ground that silicosis was not the type of
injury to be protected against by the Boiler Inspection Act, drawing a
distinction between "accidental" injuries attended by some force or
violence and purely pathological injuries occurring over a long period
of time and saying that the latter were not covered by the act.219 The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed this decision, saying that
silicosis was within the term "injury" under either the FELA or the
Boiler Inspection Act and that plaintiff might have recovered under
21- 256 Ala. 220, 54 So. 2d 453 (1951).
215 See note 156 supra.
2 16 See MoRRis, ToRTs 185, 186 (1953); PRossER, ToR's 259 (2d Ed. 1955).
217357 Mo. 738, 210 S.W. 2d 98 (1948), reversed, 337 U.S. 163 (194-9).
218352 Mo. 211, 176 S.W. 2d 471 (1943).
219 357 Mo. 738, 210 S.W. 2d 98 (1948).
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either act.22° Four of the Justices, however, agreed that under the Boiler
Inspection Act only "accidental" injuries should be compensated.221  No
other similar cases appear to have arisen under the Safety Appliance Acts,
although recovery has been granted under the FELA for chrome rash
alleged to have resulted from contact with a rust inhibitor used by the
carrier in its roundhouse over a period of time. 2 Inasmuch as at least one
court has found that permitting a boiler to be operated with water which
"foamed" and made the water gauge inaccurate was within the Boiler In-
spection Act, 2 3 it might be argued that the use of additives in the water
which could cause injury if they come in contact with the persons of em-
ployees would render the boiler unsafe to operate without unnecessary
danger. Similar arguments might be made for recovery for exposure re-
sulting from defective equipment or from construction which permits ex-
posure, 2 2 although in Powell v. Waters225 overexertion and overheating
resulting from attempts to repair a defective air pump were not treated
as the "proximate results" of the defect. In Knox v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry.,20 where plaintiff complained of loss of hearing resulting from
220 337 U.S. 163 (1949). Although the appeal was from the second reversal
by the Missouri Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States looked
back to the original proceedings and found that there was sufficient allegation
of notice on the part of the carrier of the dangers inherent in the sanders that a
claim of negligence under the FELA, independent of the violation of the Boiler
Inspection Act, could have been maintained.
2 2 1 Id. at 196-197 (Frankfurter J., with Reed, Jackson and Burton, JJ. joining
in concurring and dissenting opinion). The four justices agreed that silicosis
might be an injury within the terms of the FELA, thereby confirming the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y.
448, 55 N.E. 2d 497 (1944) permitting recovery for silicosis.
222 Evinger v. Thompson, 364 Mo. 658, 265 S.W. 2d 726 (1954).
223Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wetherington, 245 Ala. 313, 16 So. 2d 720
(1944).
224 In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) a Wisconsin
statute requiring cab curtains to protect the employees from exposure was held
ineffective since the Boiler Inspection Act represented an exercise of power over
equipment of locomotives by the federal government, although no such regulation
existed. In Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S.
1 (1943), a state regulation requiring cabooses for the protection of signalmen
was upheld in view of the failure of the I.C.C. to make any regulations in regard
to cabooses. Both opinions at least tacitly recognize that it would be within the
power of the I.C.C. under the Boiler Inspection Act to make requirements for
the health of employees. In Pullman Co. v. Montimore, 17 F. 2d 2 (5th Cir. 1927) ;
Gulf & S.I. R.R. v. Bryant, 147 Miss. 421, 111 So. 451 (1927); Gulf, C. & S.F.
Ry v. Waterhouse, 223 S.W. 2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); recovery was allowed
on the basis of negligence resulting in exposure to the elements. Cases denying
recovery under the FELA for exposure appear to turn on the question of whether
there is negligence in requiring work under certain conditions, Sabatino v. Reading
Co., 16 F. Supp. 215 (D. N. J. 1936); Wichita Falls & S.R.R. v. Burton, 35 S.W.
2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), or assumption of this sort of risk by the employee,
Chesnut v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 284 11. App. 317, 1 N.E. 2d 811 (1936).
225 55 Ga. App. 307, 190 S.E. 615 (1937).
226 95 Cal. App. 2d 896m 214 P. 2d 589 (1950).
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failure to equip the locomotive with mufflers, the court refused to allow
recovery primarily on the basis that the mufflers were not required under
the Boiler Inspection Act rather than on the question of the nature of
the injury compensable.
DEFENSES
Having examined the FELA and the Safety Appliance and Boiler
Inspection Acts and compared the nature of the duty imposed by each,
the things which will constitute a breach of that duty and the scope of
liability for such breach, let us now turn to the defenses which may be
available to the carrier in an action brought under one or more of these
acts. At the very outset of such a discussion, it should be repeated that
the defense of due care which is available under the FELA alone can-
not be raised in relation to either of the other two acts. It remains to
be seen whether the "absolute" nature of the duty imposed upon the
carrier also has the effect of removing any other defenses.
Assumption of Risk
The original FELA provided that in an action brought to recover
damages for injuries to, or the death of an employee of a common car-
rier the employee should not be held to have assumed the risks of his
employment if the carrier's violation of a statute enacted for the safety
of employees had contributed to the injury or death.22 This left open
the assumption of risk defense in actions not brought under the Safety
Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts.2 29 In 1939, an amendment to
the FELA extended the provisions of this section so that today an em-
ployer is not deemed to have assumed the risks of his employment "where
such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier" as well as
where the injury or death resulted in whole or in part from violation
of a safety act.23
0
The original Safety Appliance Act also did away with assumption
of risks occasioned by a violation of its provisions.231 In Schlemmer v.
Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry., 32 in an effort to couple two cars
which had failed to couple on the first impact, the plaintiff's decedent
went between the cars to guide the drawbar and was crushed when the
cars came together. The trial court directed a nonsuit on the ground
that the decedent had been guilty of contributory negligence rather than
merely having assumed the risk. The Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded saying that the defense of assumption of risk covered both the
risk of negligence of others and the risk of defective appliances, that
assumption of risk shaded into negligence, and that great care must be
228 Act of April 22, 1908, §4-, 35 Stat. 66.
229 See, e.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Leonidas, 305 U.S. 1 (1938).
230 Act of August 11, 1939, §1, 45 U.S.C. §54 (1952 ed.).
231 Act of March 2, 1893, §8, 45 U.S.C. §7 (1952 ed.).
232205 U.S. 1 (1908).
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taken lest "the servant's rights ... be sacrificed by simply charging him
with assumption of risk under another name."2 3 Following a second
trial and a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, a judgment n.o.v. was
granted on the ground that the evidence established contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law, which judgment was affirmed in a second
hearing by the Supreme Court.234 Other cases have repeated the ad-
monition of the first Schlemmer opinion that the courts must not bar the
plaintiff's actions by treating what would normally be an assumption
of risk as "contributory negligence." 3  The distinction is at best a
hazy one, but the standard seems to be that announced in the first
Schlemmer opinion:
... the practical difference of the two ideas is in their degree
of proximity to the particular harm. The preliminary conduct
of getting into a dangerous employment or relation is said to
be accompanied by assumption of the risk. The act more
immediately leading to a specific accident is called negligent.
But the difference between the two is one of degree rather
than of kind; ...236
Looking at the facts of that case, the decedent's going between the cars
was apparently merely an assumption of risk, while his rising up as the
cars came together so that his head was between them could be treated
as contributory negligence.
The Boiler Inspection Act makes no provision as to assumption of
risk, although where an action is brought under the FELA, as usually
occurs, the defense is negated by the terms of the latter act. It has been
suggested that under the Boiler Inspection Act, as under the other two,
there is no defense of assumption of risk,2 32 but the cases so stating in-
volve the FELA. 35 In view of the language of the second Schlemmer
case that in the absence of statute such defenses continue, 23 9 and in view
of the fact that assumption of risk has been recognized as a defense in
other actions relying upon liability without fault,2 40 some argument could
233 Id. at 13.
234220 U.S. 590 (1911).
235 See, e.g., Chicago Junction Ry. v. King, 169 Fed. 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1909),
afI'd, 222 U.S. 222 (1911) ; Byler v. Wabash R.R., 196 F. 2d 9, 12 (8th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. $26 (1952).
236 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 205 U. S. 1, 12 (1907).
237 Richter and Forer, Federal Employers' Liability 4ct, 12 FED. RULES DEC.
12, 1946 (1952).
238 See, e.g., Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 317 U.S. 481, 491 (1943)
McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 F. 2d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 1946); Erie R.R.
v. Lindquist, 27 F. 2d 98, 99 (3d Cir. 1928); Cantley v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 353
Mo. 605, 612, 183 S.W. 2d 123, 126, (1944).
239 Schlemmer v. Buffalo ,R. & P. Ry., 220 U. S. 590, 597 (1911).
240 See, e.g., E. L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F. 2d 855 (10th
Cir. 1949); Bowen v. Boston & A. R.R., 179 Mass. 524, 61 N.E. 141 (1901);
Brown v. Barter, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174 S.W. 2d 298 (1943). See also, HARPER,
Torts 349 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS 342 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §523
(1934).
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be made for treating assumption of risk as a valid defense in a non-
FELA action brought under the Boiler Inspection Act. Against such
argument are cases holding that assumption of risk should not be a
defense to an action based upon violation of a statute, where the statute
is designed to protect individuals who are not in a position to obtain full
protection from the dangers themselves.24 1 If assumption of risk is
limited to the situation where the plaintiff continues to engage in normal
employment after knowledge of the violation has been brought home
to him, and is not extended to including any activity upon the part of
the plaintiff which increases the otherwise existing risk, this author agrees
that the policy of the Boiler Inspection' Act would be better carried out
by denying to the carrier this defense, even though no such denial ap-
pears in the language of the statute itself.
242
Contributory Negligence
From the beginning, the FELA did away with contributory negli-
gence as a complete bar to recovery. Where injury or death was the
result of a violation of one of the safety acts, the employee cannot be
found guilty of contributory negligence. In actions were the safety
statutes are not involved, a doctrine of comparative negligence is intro-
duced to reduce recovery to the extent that the employee's negligence
contributed to the injury.2 43
No similar provision appears in either the Safety Appliance or the
Boiler Inspection Acts. As indicated above, in Schlemmer v. Buffalo,
Rochester & Pittsburg Ry.2 44 the Supreme Court recognized that where
reliance is placed solely upon the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act,
contributory negligence may be a defense. Later cases have continued
to recognize such a defense under the Safety Appliance Acts.2 45 The
241 See, e.g, Osborne v. Salvation Army, 107, F. 2d 929 (2nd Cir. 1939);
Narramore v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 96 Fed. 298 (6th Cir. 1899); Sues
v. Arrowhead Steel Products Co., 180 Minn. 21, 230 N.W. 125 (1930); Dusha v.
Virginia & Rainey Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920); Welch v.
Waturbury Co., 206 N.Y. 522, 100 N.E. 426 (1912). Cf. Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal.
2d 654, 204 P. 2d 1 (1949).
242 One possible explanation for the omission of any reference to either
assumption of risk or contributory negligence in the Boiler Inspection Act was
the precence of 45 U.S.C. §§53, 54 (1952 ed.) This still leaves the non-FELA
cases without the benefit of these provisions, but many states have adopted state
employers' liability acts which contain similar provisions, see e.g., IOWA CODE
§§479.124, 479.125 (1954); MINN. STATS. ANN. §§219.79, 219.80 (1947).
243 Act of April 22, 1908, §3, 45 U.S.C. §53 (1952 ed.).
244 205 U.S. 1 (1907) (first trial) ; 220 U.S. 590 (1911) (second trial).
245 Fairport, P. & E. R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934) ; Minneapolis St.
P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Poplar, 237 U.S. 369 (1915); Jackson v. Pirtle, 75 Ind. App.
336, 127 N.E. 305 (1920); Floyd v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 250, 201 S. E. 2d 390
(1947). Cf. San Antonio, & A.P. Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 480 (1916); El
Paso & S.W. Ry. v. Vizard, 211 U.S. 608, 611 (1909); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Thomas, 21 Ariz. 355, 364 (188 Pac. 268, 271 1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 576
(1921); Thornbro v. Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry., 91 Kan. 684, 695-696 139 Pac.
410, 413-414 (1914).
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argument has recently been made in two law review articles 40 that since
liability under the acts is based not upon negligence but upon "absolute
duty", the defense of contributory negligence is not and should not be
available. One of these articles cites as authority Zumwalt v. Gardner,24 7
in which the court did not actually deny the defense of contributory
negligence. There the court merely said that an instruction referring to
that defense was erroneous because it emphasized the carrier's claim of
having used due care to prevent the accident from occurring. The argu-
ment in the second of these articles depends upon the trio of cases,
O'Donnell, Carter and Affolder, and the policy which the authors find
in these cases of imposing an unqualified obligation upon the carrier as
the person most likely to prevent injuries from defective equipment. 248
This argument carries considerable weight, particularly when supported by
reference to other situations in which contributory negligence has been
denied as a defense to actions based on strict liability.2 49 However, the
present author does not agree with the argument and believes that the
cases which have continued to recognize contributory negligence as a
defense to non-FELA claims support the better view. This conclusion
is based on the belief that the objective of the safety acts may be ac-
complished sufficiently by the denial of the defense of due care and the
imposition of a lighter burden of proof upon the plaintiff, which is all
that O'Donnell, Carter and A4ffolder do. If the carrier cannot escape
liability by bringing in evidence of the care taken to avoid the accident,
and if the injured party may recover by showing mere failure to function,
it seems likely that the carrier will have sufficient reason to comply to the
fullest extent possible with the provisions of these acts. Furthermore,
there seems to be no strong policy argument in favor of compensating an
individual who has himself substantially contributed to his own injury
by doing something more than merely continuing to work with notice of
the defect. If a complete bar seems overly onerous, Congress could
amend the safety acts to make provision for "comparative negligence." 250
240 Richter and Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act. 12 FED. RULES DEC.
12, 43 (1952) ; Louisell and Anderson, The Safety Appliance Act and the FELA:
.A Plea for Clarification, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 281, 288-295 (1953).
247 160 F. 2d 298 (8th Cir. 1947), cited in Richter and Forer, supra note
246.
24S Louisell and Anderson, supra note 246.
249 Fraser v. Patterson Lumber Co., v. Southern Ry., 79 F. Supp. 424 (W.D.-
S.C. 1948) ; Bowman v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa 234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906) ; Stackpole
v. Healy, 17 Mass. 33 (1819); Matthews v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 142 Mo. 645, 44
SAV. 802 (1897). See Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation
of Statutes, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 105 (1948). See also, Prosser, Torts 341-343 (2d
ed. 1955); Harper, Torts 347-348 (1933) for discussion of plaintiff's conduct
as a defense to an action based on strict liability.
250 Apparently in the process of defining the duty under these acts, Congress
may also regulate defenses as well. At least the Schlemmer cases, supra notes
232, 234, speak as if assumption of risk was eliminated as a defense in all actions
arising under the Safety Appliance Acts.
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Where contributory negligence has been recognized as a defense
in actions under the Safety Appliance Acts, it has generally involved
more than a mere continuation of working in connection with equipment
which is defective after knowledge of the defect has been brought to
the attention of the employee. In the Schlemmer case251 the plaintiff's
decedent had not only gone between the cars but had risen up as the
cars came together although he must have known of the dangers of so
rising. In Popplar v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Sainte Marie Ry. 2 2
the brakeman had gone between moving cars in violation of the rule of
the company. In Jackson v. Pirtle,53 the plaintiff had selected his own
way of getting the couplings to work, apparently by kicking the
coupling as the cars were brought together. In Floyd v. Thompson, 54
the deceased attempted to manipulate brakes and move car without taking
the precaution of removing a nearby truck against which the loaded
car collided. A showing of something more than a mere assumption of
risk may be made by evidence that a company rule has been violated,
as in the Popplar case or as in Bocook v. Louissille & Nashville
R.R.,255 where the employee went onto a track in violation of a com-
pany rule. It should be kept in mind, of course, that if the practical
necessities of the situation demand disregard of the rule, as where an
employee attempts to jump onto moving cars to stop them when they
break loose from the remainder of a train, the violation of the rule may
be within the zone of reasonable action25
It should also be noted that since this defense is available only in
actions which are non-FELA actions, state law will govern and there-
fore such variations as "last clear chance" 257 and comparative negli-
gence 258 may enter into the actions. Perhaps more important are some
state railroad laws which do away with contributory negligence as a
defense in state proceedings. 25
9
There appear to be no cases involving the question of contributory
negligence as a defense to the Boiler Inspection Acts, other than passing
251 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 220 U. S. 590 (1911).
252121 Minn. 413, 141 N.W. 798 (1913), aff'd, 237 U.S. 369 (1915).
253 75 Ind. App. 336, 127 N.E. 305 (1929).
254 356 Mo. 250, 201 S.E. 2d 390 (1947).
255 67 F. Supp. 154, (E.D. Ky. 1946) (FELA so no contributory negligence).
256 See Popplar v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry., 121 Mnin. 413, 141 N.W.
798 (1913).
257 Fairport, P. & E. R.R., 292 U.S. 589 (1934) where the Ohio court applied
not only the doctrine of "last clear chance" but also the allied doctrine of ""ante-
cedent negligence" which is not generally accepted in this country.
258 See, PROSSER, TORTS 296-299.
259 See, e.g., IOWA CODE §479.125 (1954); MINN. STAT. ANN. §219.79 (1947).
See also, ILL. RaV. STAT. c. 114, §152 (1953) which applies only to the Illinois
Safety Appliance Act.; OHIO RE v. CODE §4973.09 (1955) which introduces into
actions by employees against railroads the concept of comparative negligence with
the further provision that if the employee's negligence is slight and the carrier's
great there shall be no bar at all and no diminution of damages.
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reference to the denial of this defense under the FELA.2 60 Since, how-
ever, the safety acts are generally dealt with in the same manner, it
seems likely that the same results would follow here as in the case of
violations of the Safety Appliance Acts which are not within the FELA.
Fellow Servant Doctrine
The common law doctrine that a servant might not hold his master
liable for injuries resulting solely from the negligence of a fellow
servant has been recognized in actions not within any of the three acts
here involved.2 ' The FELA, by specifically referring to the injuries
resulting from the negligence of agents or employees, appears to have
abolished this defense as to actions brought under it.262 Even before the
enactment of the safety acts, the Supreme Court had recognized an ex-
ception to the fellow servant doctrine in cases involving the duty to
supply a safe place to work and safe equipment, saying that as to these
duties the carrier could not avoid liability by showing that the lack of
safe equipment was the result of negligence of the fellow servants. 26
For this reason, cases arising under the safety acts have referred to the
negligence of fellow servants as a defense only where such negligence
relates to the operation of the equipment and becomes the sole cause of
the injury.2 4 Even if this exception to the doctrine were not recognized,
however, the negligence of a fellow servant in causing equipment to be-
come unsafe within the terms of the acts should be disregarded for two
reasons. First, the doctrine is merely a specialized form of assumption
of risk, 265 one of the hazards of employment which is accepted by the
260 See, e.g., Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 317 U.S. 481, 491 (1945);
McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 F. 2d S77, 380 (7th Cir. 1946); Louisville
& N. R.R., v. Stephens, 29S Ky. 328, 337, 182 S.V. 2d 447, 453 (1944).
2261 New England R.R. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323 (1399) ; Baltimore & 0. R.R.
v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 363 (1893).
262 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 313 U.S. 54 (1943) ; Jamison v. Encar-
nacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930); Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. V. Rock, 279 U.S. 410
(1929); Chicago, R. 1. & P. Ry. v. Ward, 252 U.S. 13 (1920); Boldt v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 245 U.S. 441 (191); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. De Atley, 241 U.S.
310 (1916) ; Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915). Although there
has been language to the effect that an employee assumes the risk of negligence
of his fellow employees under the FELA, Toledo, St. L. & W. R.R., v. Allen, 276
U.S. 165, 169 (1923), such statements predate the 1939 abolition of assumption
of risk in all cases under the FELA, see 45 U.S.C. §54 (1952 ed.), and are
inconsistent with the language of 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952 ed.) and the cases cited
above.
263 Union Pac. R.R. v. Daniels, 152 U.S. 684 (1894); Northern Pac. R.R.
v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1385) ; Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213 (1879).
264 See, e.g., St. Louis, 1.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 231 (1908); Grew
v. Boston & M.R.R., S3 N.H. 333, 142 At]. 707 (1928); Rush v. Thompson, 355
Mo. 563, 202 S.W. 2d 800 (1947); Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P. 2d
639 (1943).
265 See, e.g., Toledo, St. L. & V. R.R. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 169 (1928);
New England R.R. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323, 327 (1899); PROSSER, TORTS 380 (2d
ed. 1955).
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employee as a condition of employment, and as indicated above assump-
tion of risk should not be a defense to a violation of the safety acts.
Second, although the master in the ordinary situation might have an
argument that when he supplied equipment which was originally safe
and also used reasonable care in choosing employees he had satisfied any
duty of due care, under these acts the due care of the carrier is irrelevant.
To. allow him to avoid liability on the basis of the negligence of a fellow
servant (which would be the likely cause of couplers, brakes and grab
irons becoming defective) would be inconsistent with the theory of lia-
bility imposed by these acts.
M~scellaneous Defenses
The FELA contains a specific statute of limitations of three years
from the date when the cause of action accrued.2 "6 No such provisions
appear in either of the safety acts, and where actions are brought on
them not within the terms of the FELA, state procedure controls. 0 7
The FELA provides that "any contract, rule regulation or device
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this
chapter, shall to that extent be void," with the proviso that the carrier
may set off any sum contributed or paid to insurance, relief, benefit or
indemnity which has been paid to the injured employee or the person
entitled to maintain the action on account of the employee's injury or
death.2" It is clear that this provision does not relate to releases or
settlements made after the injury has occurred,.. but is intended to
prevent the carrier from obtaining a general release prior to the accident
from all claims that might arise out of employment,270 or from estab-
lishing unreasonable company rules placing the burden on the employee
266 Act of April 22, 1908, §6, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §56 (1952 ed.). As to
the question of when the cause of action accrues in cases involving occupational
disease, see Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Sadowski v. Long Island
.R., 292 N.Y. 448, 55 N.E. 2d 497 (1944). As to accrual of actions for death
of employees, see Baltimore & 0. S.W. R.R. v. Carroll, 290 U.S. 491 (1930); Dusek
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 68 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir. 1933).
267 Nichols v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 195 Fed. 913 (6th Cir. 1912); Walton
v. Southern Pac. Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 290, 48 P. 2d. 168 (1935); Grew v. Boston
& M. R.R., 83 N.H. 383, 142 Atl. 707 (1928).
268 Act of April 22, 1908, §5, 45 U.S.C. §55 (1952 ed.).
269 Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625 (1948); Ahern v. Southern
Buffalo Ry., 103 N. 545, 104 N.E. 2d 898 (1952), afj'd 344 U.S. 367 (1953); Falco
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 202 Miss. 769, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 279 (1951). An indemnity
agreement entered into by a railroad with one other than the injured employee
does not affect the claims of the employee at all, Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Daven-
port, 205 F. 2d 589 (5th Cir. 1953); Gaulden v. Southern Pac. Co., 78 F. Supp.
651 (N. D. Cal. 1948).
270 Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603 (1912); Oliver v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 196 Fed. 432 (N.D. Wash. 1912); Rief v. Great Northern Ry.,
126 Minn. 430, 148 N.W. 309 (1914).
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to protect himself from dangers which are the normal basis of lia-
bility,2"' or from obtaining agreements to limit the venue of an action
brought against the railroad. 2 Since the Safety Appliance and Boiler
Inspection Acts contain no such provision, the effect of general waivers
of rights, rules, etc. are left to state law in cases which involve only
intrastate commerce.2 73
On the basis of federal supremacy, state compensation laws can not
bar an action under the FELA.2 74 It is now settled, however, that since
actions brought under either of the safety acts independent of the
FELA are common law actions and not federally created rights of
action, state compensation laws may validly bar the common law action.
2 75
To meet the common law rule that all causes of action for personal
injury terminate on the death of the victim, the FELA contains two
specific provisions allowing the personal representative of a deceased
employee to maintain an action for the benefit of the surviving widow
or husband and the children of the employee, or if none exist for the
benefit of the parents or next of kin. The first of these is an action for
271 Byler v. Wabash R.R., 196 F. 2d 9 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S.
826 (1952); Cato v. Atlanta & C.A. L. Ry., 164 S.C. 123, 162 S.E. 239 (1931);
Fried v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 183 App. Div 115, 170 N.Y. Supp. 697 (1918).
As to safety rules which are reasonably necessary for the operation of the rail-
road, and which therefore do not become void under this section, see Jacobson v.
Chicago & N.V. Ry., 221 Minn. 454, 22 N.W. 2d 455 (1946); Grosvenor v. New
York Cent. R.R., 343 Mo. 611, 123 SAV. 2d 173 (1938).
272Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 338 U.S. 263 (1949); Krenger v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F. 2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949)
Akerly v. New York Cent. R.R., 168 F. 2d 812 (6th Cir. 1948).
273 Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57 (1934). For a general
discussion of releases and avoidance thereof for fraud or mistake gee 3 CORBIN,
CONTRA=r 358-359, 6 Id. 142-143 (1950). Such means of avoiding releases would
seem to apply equally to FELA actions where the release is not barred by the
above section.
274 See, e.g., Boston & M. R.R. v. Armburg, 285 U. S. 234 (1932); New
York Cent. R.R. v. Proter, 249 U.S. 160 (1919); New York Cent. R.R. v. Win-
field, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
27 5Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 298 U.S. 141 (1936). Prior to the
decision in the Tipton case, two California cases, Walton v. Southern Pac. Co., 8
Cal. App. 2d 290, 48 P. 2d 108 (1935); Ballard v. Sacramento Northern Ry.,
126 Cal. App. 486, 14 P. 2d 1045, 15 P. 2d 793 (1932) had held that since there
was a common law action under the federal safety acts this was not excluded by
the California compensation act. In Breisch v. Central R.R., 312 U.S. 484 (1941),
the Court aftec recognizing that the cause of action was controlled by state law,
relied upon Miller v. Reading Co., 292 Pa. 44, 140 At. 618 (1928), in holding that
in Pennsylvania an action based on the Federal Safety Appliance Act and "not
arising from the ordinary relation of employer and employee" was enforcible by
a common law action irrespective of the compensation law. In Gilvary v. Cuy-
ahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57 (1934), the court gave effect to an agreement between
the carrier and the plaintiff that any recovery for injuries sustained while plaintiff
was engaged in intrastate commerce was to be governed by the Ohio workmen's
compensation act.
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death,276 the other a survival action. 77 While the Safety Appliance Acts
and the Boiler Inspection Act lack such provisions, several courts have
allowed actions after the death of the employee based on these safety
acts alone. 78  With the more recent recognition that these safety acts
create no federal cause of action, although they may give rise to common
law actions in the state courts, it would seem that any survival or
wrongful death action would be dependent upon the state statutes on
279this matter.
Whereas the FELA provides for a rather comprehensive unified
system of protection of employees of carriers who are engaged in inter-
state commerce, the safety acts do little more than spell out the nature
of the duty imposed upon carriers. The result is that where the injured
person is an employee who is engaged only in intrastate commerce,
or is not even an employee of the carrier, the machinery of recovery is
left largely to the determination of the states themselves. This may re-
sult in inconsistencies in the protection offered two individuals injured
in the same manner, or inconsistencies in the protection offered to a
single person by the courts of two different states.
2 76 Act of April 22, 1908, §1, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952 ed.). In order to maintain
such an action the personal representative must allege and establish the existence
of the designated beneficiaries. Moffet v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 220 Fed. 39 (4th
Cir. 1914); Thomas v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 202 Fed. 766 (N.D. Iowa 1913);
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Dorman, 205 Ala. 609, 89 So. 70 (1921). This section
creates a cause of action which is distinct from that of the employee and under
which only the pecuniary loss to the designated beneficiaries may be recovered.
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915); Michigan Cent. R.R. v.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1912).
277 Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143 §2, 36 STAT. 291, 45 U.S.C. §59 (1952 ed.).
This provision for a survival action was necessary since under the original FELA
the cause of action of the employee was held not to survive, St. Louis, I.M. & S.
Ry. v. Hasterly, 228 U.S. 702 (1913); Fulgham v. Midland Valley Ry., 167 Fed.
660 (W.D. Ark. 1909); Walsh v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 173 Fed. 494- (D.
Mass. 1909). Since the damages recoverable may include pain and suffering of
the deceased employee prior to his death, as distinguished from the damages
under the wrongful death provisions of the original FELA, there must be some
showing that the employee did live if even for a short time following the accident.
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915); Norfolk & V. Ry. v.
Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625 (1915). In bringing this survival action, as in the case of
the death action, it is necessary to plead and prove the existence of the desig-
nated beneficiaries. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Holdham, 188 Okla. 245, 107 P. 2d
1917 (1940); Cf. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., v. Claybourne, 169 Ky. 315, 183
S.W. 903 (1916).
278Ross v. Schooley, 257 Fed. 290 (7th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 615
(1919) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Logansport Loan & Trust Co., 29 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir.
1928); Kraemer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 148 Minn. 310, 181 N.W. S48 (1921).
279 See, e.g., Tipton v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 298 U.S. 141, 147-148 (1936);
Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 206 F. 2d 153, 157 (1st Cir. 1953), Cen-
tral R. R. of N. J. v. Breisch, 112 F. 2d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 1940).
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JOINDER OF CLAIMS
A plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries resulting from the use of
railroad equipment may benefit from reliance upon both the FELA and
the Safety Appliance Acts and/or the Boiler Inspection Act. The latter
permit him to recover without having to prove lack of care on the part
of the carrier and may allow him to establish his claim simply by showing
that the equipment failed to function properly. The former allows him
to recover not only for defective construction or failure to function but
also for negligent operation of otherwise safe equipment. The FELA
also makes it explicit that he will not be met by the defenses of assump-
tion of risk, the fellow servant doctrine and contributory negligence and
in case of the death of the employee assures that an action may be
maintained for the benefit of the next of kin.
Where there is no doubt that the plaintiff was an employee of an
interstate carrier engaged in work closely connected with interstate
commerce, and he can establish a violation of one of the safety acts,
no difficulty arises in bringing a FELA action relying upon the safety
act to create an "absolute" duty breach of which constitutes "negli-
gence"."'0 There is no problem of joinder, but rather a single cause of
action. Such an action may be brought in either a federal or a state
court having jurisdiction over the defendant carrier.281
But plaintiff may be in some doubt as to whether he can establish
a violation of one of the safety acts, such as where a coupling did not
make and the failure may be the result either of defective equipment or
negligent operation of the couplers by a fellow employee or where a
boiler explodes and the explosion could be due either to a defect in
construction or maintenance of the boiler or negligence on the part of
the engineer in failing to maintain the proper water level in the boiler.
In such a situation, it would be advantageous to bring an action under
the FELA in which the complaint alleges both a violation of the safety
act and common law negligence in operation. Inasmuch as both of these
claims are within the terms of the FELA, the action may be brought in
either a federal or a state court, but some question arises as to whether
the plaintiff is alleging one or two causes of action and whether they
may be joined.
It might appear that there is in fact but one cause of action, since
there is presumably but one injury to the plaintiff and the facts sur-
rounding that injury might be treated as a unit for the purpose of finding
a violation of a duty on the part of the carrier. It has been suggested
2S0 See, e.g., Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 317 U.S. 481, 485 (1943);
Baltimore & 0. R.R v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 528 (1925); Spokane & I. R.R.
v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 510 (1915); San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 241 U.S. 476,
484 (1915).
281 Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, §1, 36 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C. §56 (1952 ed.).
Questions of when jurisdiction does exist and problems of venue are not discussed
here, except as to the existence of a federal cause of action.
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that for most purposes a "cause of action" should be defined as "an
aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right or rights . ..which
will be enforced by the courts," with the number and extent of the facts
to be included within a single cause dependent upon considerations of
practical trial convenience.282 Adopting this view, the primary objections
to treating claims for violation of a safety act and for common law
negligence as but two theories for the single cause of action would appear
to be the difference in the nature of the duty upon which each claim is
based and the fact that procedural problems differ. Contributory negli-
gence is irrelevant to the violation of the safety act, but may be used to
reduce damages for negligence. Under the Safety Appliance Acts failure
of a coupler to hold or couple or failure of a brake to function is the
ultimate question, whereas under the claim for negligence it is an evi-
dentiary fact which may be used to raise an inference of negligence, but
does not preclude a finding for the defendant. Such distinctions probably
justify a requirement that the claims be pleaded in separate counts and
that the jury be given separate instructions as to each claim,28 3 but they
do not necessarily demand that the claims be tried separately so that
joinder is improper. Since for the purposes of the FELA the only ques-
tions which will be raised are those of manner of pleading and per-
missibility of joinder, if these two obstacles can be overcome it may not
be necessary for a court to make a decision as to whether one or two
causes of action are involved. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure28 4 and similar liberal provisions of state pleading285 all claims
which the plaintiff has against a single party may be joined in one
complaint. Where the state statutes permit joinder of all causes for in-
jury to the person28 6 or for injuries to person and property287 or all
causes arising out of the same transaction,28 8 there is likewise no problem
of joinder. Even in those states which have retained forms of action,
joinder is possible because both claims do come within the same form. s28
282 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 127 (2d ed. 1947).
283 See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384, 391-392 (1949);
Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 69 N.W. 2d 673, 682-683 (Minn. 1955).
284 FED. RULES Crv. PROC 18 (a).
285E.g, IOWA RULES Civ. PRoC. 22 (1943); MINN. RULES CiV. PROC. §18.01
(1952); NEv. RULES CIV. PROC. 18(a) (1953); N.Y. CiV. PRAC. ACT. §258 (1955
Supp).
28E.g., CAL. CODE. CIV. PROC. §DBG (West 1955); ORE. COMP. LAWS §1-911
(1940); WASH. REv. CODE §4.36.150 (1955).
287 OHIo REV. CODE §2309.5 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. §7819 (1949 rev);
NEB. REV. STAT. §25-701 (1948 rev).
288CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §427 (West 1955) permits joinder under this
heading and also joinder of claims for injury to person and injury to property
"arising out of the same tort"; WASH. REV. CODE §4.36.150 (1955). See also statutes
cited in note 287 supra.
289MASS. ANN LAWS c. 231 §§1, 7a (1954); VT. REv. STAT. §1611 (1947)
classify all sections as "contract, tort or replevin." As to permissibility of joinder
of a claim for violation of statute and a common law claim for negligence see
Bouchard v. Central Vermont Ry., 87 Vt. 399, 89 Atl. 475 (1914).
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Much the same questions may be raised with regard to attempts
to join claims under the Safety Appliance Acts and under the Boiler
Inspection Act. Such joinder may be desirable if it is not clear whether
there has been a violation of one or the other, as where an employee falls
from a tender and it is uncertain whether his fall was due to improper
grab irons or a collection of ice as in the Lilly case. Here, in fact, the
similarity of procedure and defenses would appear to argue even more
strongly for the view that there is a single cause of action with two
theories.
A more difficult case arises where the plaintiff is uncertain as to
whether he can bring himself within the terms of the FELA, although
he believes he can rely upon a violation of a safety act. This may occur
where he is nominally an employee of an independent contractor who
works in close conjunction with the railroad employees and may or may
not be subject to control by the carrier. In such a situation the plaintiff
will want to join a claim under the FELA for violation of the safety
act with a claim under the common law for violation of the statutory
duty. This not only raises the question of joinder, but also a question of
whether there are separate and distinct causes of action for the purposes
of federal jurisdiction. The federal courts have made it clear that
absent diversity of citizenship290 a claim relying upon the safety acts
alone is not a subject of federal jurisdiction."' Therefore where the
plaintiff attempts to join a claim under the FELA and a non-FELA
claim, the court will have to apply the test set up in Hurn v. Oursler292 :
whether there is a single cause of action with two distinct grounds in
support thereof, or whether there are two distinct causes of action. The
application of this test is undoubtedly one of practical administration,
since the injury to the plaintiff is the same under both claims. The
problem of administration may be somewhat more complicated than in
the situations above, however, for there may be differing statutes of
limitations, differing rules for death actions,2 93 and differing rules as to
the effect of a general release. There is certain to be a difference in the
defense of contributory negligence, and under the Boiler Inspection Act
there may be a defense of assumption of risk. Such differences have led
several courts to treat the claims as separate, at least for the purposes of
200 As to the problem of diversity of citizenship where the defendant is in-
corporated in more than one state, see Patch v. Wabash R.R. 207 U.S. 277 (1907) ;
Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R., 197 F. 2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952); Gavin v. Hudson &
M. R.R. 185 F. 2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950); Waller v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
127 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), noted 3 U.C.L.A. LAw REV. 98 (1955).
291 Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 206 F. 2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953).
292289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933).
293 In California, for example, an action may be brought under the survival
statute for the benefit of the estate at large, CAL. Civ. CoDE §956 (West 1955),
although the death actions are limited much as the FELA, CAL. COnE CIV. PRoc.
§377 (West 1955):
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pleading. 94 It should be noted that for purposes of amendment to allege
a new claim, the federal courts seem to treat such claims as a single
cause of action with two theories.295 In view of the desirability of
having but one trial of the same fact situation seeking the same relief, i.e.
compensation for injury, the author believes that the federal courts
should treat the safety act claim at least as "ancillary" to the federal
claim under the FELA and take jurisdiction over both. Of course,
in state courts no such problem exists as to jurisdiction, since both are
within the state court's jurisdiction.
As has been stated above, where claims are made under two or
more of these acts independent of one another they should be pleaded
in separate counts.2"6 It appears unnecessary, however, that the specific
acts be referred to by name, so long as the essential elements of an
action under each is alleged."' For example, under the FELA, the
plaintiff must allege that the defendant is a carrier by railroad engaged
in interstate commerce, that he is an employee of such carrier (or the
personal representative with the designated beneficiaries surviving2 9 8 )
and was employed in interstate commerce at the time of injury, and
that the injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence
of the carrier, its officers, agents or employees, or from a defect due to
the negligence of the carrier. Under the Boiler Inspection Act it
apparently would be sufficient to allege that the injury resulted from
the locomotive, tender, or an appurtenance thereof not being in proper
condition nor safe to operate in the service to which it is put without
unnecessary peril to life or limb. But there is also some indication that
an allegation of "negligence in law" will cover any proof of violation
of the safety acts. 2 9
9
CONCLUSION
All three of the acts here involved have as their major objective
the protection of individuals from the perils arising from railroad opera-
tions. Of the three, the FELA is the narrowest in terms of the nature
294 Bankson v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 196 Fed. 171 (N.D. Iowa 1912); Walton
v. Southern Pac. Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 290, 48 P. 2d 108 (1935) ; Hallada v. Great
Northern Ry., 69 N.W. 2d 673 (Minn. 1955); Harlan v. Wabash Ry., 335 Mo.
414, 73 S.W. 2d 749 (1934); Bouchard v. Central Vermont Ry., 87 Vt. 399, 89
At. 475 (1914).
295 See, New York Cent. R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340 (1922); Seaboard
Air Line R.R. v. Koenneck, 239 U.S. 352 (1915); Missouri, T. & T. Ry. v. Wulf,
226 U.S. 570 (1913).
296 See, O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384, 391-393 (1949) ; Bank-
son v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 196 Fed. 171 (N.D. Iowa 1912); Hallada v. Great
Northern Ry., 69 N.W. 2d 673, 682-683 (Minn. 1955).
297 See, Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42 (1914) ; Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 225 U.S. 477 (1912) ; Southern Ry. v. Peters, 194- Ala. 94,
69 So. 610 (1915) ; Stanton v. Virginian R.R., 119 W. Va. 658, 195 S.E. 601 (1938).
298 See cases cited notes 276, 277, supra.
299 Scott v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 151 F. 2d 81 (2d Cir. 194-5); Wyatt v.
New York, 0. & W. R.R., 45 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930).
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of duty imposed upon the carrier and the individuals who may take
advantage of its protection. While the Safety Appliance Acts and
Boiler Inspection Act impose a much more stringent duty and may be
relied upon by more individuals, they are more limited in terms of the
types of causes for which recovery may be obtained and the defenses
unavailable under the FELA which are available under state laws. In
view of the general nature of activity which covered by these acts, it is
not surprising to discover that the vast majority of actions fall within
the area in which the FELA and the safety acts overlap, and where
they supplement each other in giving a comprehensive system of pro-
tection to the employee of an interstate carrier. While the ability of
Congress to make the safety acts applicable to others indicates that it
might also have provided such comprehensive protection for all persons
injured, it has not seen fit to do so. Undoubtedly this arises from some
belief that the stringent duty imposed upon the carrier, unencumbered by
certain common law defenses, should primarily be directed toward
those who give the greatest benefit to the carrier, its employees. The
other large class of persons conferring benefits on the carrier, the
passengers, were already protected by the common law imposition of
"the highest duty of care" on the part of the carrier 00 The author is
inclined to agree that the present coverage of these acts is adequate.
300 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. MDE §2100 (West 1955) which purports to be a
recital of the common law duty of a carrier for hire. The duty has been made
more stringent by the use of a presumption based on res ipsa loquitur, see
Housel v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 167 Cal. 245, 139 Pac. 73 (1914); McCurrie v.
Southern Pac. Co., 122 Cal. 558, 55 Pac. 324 (1898). See also, PROSSER, TORrTs 147
(2d Ec. 1955).
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